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Abstract
This thesis considers ways in which humanitarian organizations can evaluate their
performance internally, signal their performance to others, and what this might mean
for the humanitarian relief community as a whole. Part I demonstrates an approach
by which humanitarian organizations can develop key performance indicators (KPIs)
to measure the performance of their logistics and supply chain activities, using a non-
profit specializing in the provision of medical relief as a case study. This thesis argues
that a system of KPIs developed and analyzed by the organization can help improve
operational performance, establish goals, and guide strategy.
Part II then examines high-level organizational trends in the United States inter-
national relief sector, and questions whether contemporary literature on such trends
find support in data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). This thesis argues that
the humanitarian "market" today exists in a newly competitive state defined by this
paper as "response-leadership." The humanitarian sector thus mirrors concentrated
for-profit markets that embody the price-leadership model.
This thesis finally suggests governmental and institutional policies concerning
performance measurement that, given the competitive nature of the humanitarian
marketplace defined in Part II, may improve market mechanisms in this sector.
Thesis Supervisor: Jarrod Goentzel
Title: Director, MIT Humanitarian Response Lab
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Chapter 1
Introduction
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in
his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing
it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of
others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That
we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to
require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions
of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they
perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most
hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it."
-Smith (1790, pp. 4)
Consider the last time you donated money, food, or any sort of gift to a charitable
cause. What led you to this decision? Did you give because you had some deep
connection with the charity, or did they have a nifty advertising campaign? Was
the cause local or far from home? Maybe you donated because you truly believe in
the charity's service, or maybe you donated to lower your tax bracket. Or perhaps
you are purely altruistic by nature, and gave without even knowing or caring who
15
the donation was going to. Regardless of which organization you chose and why, did
you ever consider, among the hundreds and if not thousands of charities providing
similar services, which one performed "the best"?
This thesis considers the issue of performance and quality in regards to charitable
action, specifically within what will occasionally be referred to as the "humanitar-
ian marketplace." There are two reasons why this is a topic of concern today. First,
organizations that engage in humanitarian activities, such as disaster relief and inter-
national development, are becoming increasingly interested in the effectiveness and
efficiency of the programs they pursue. Further, donors to these organizations, in-
cluding governments, corporations, foundations, and individuals, are more concerned
with how their money and gifts are impacting beneficiaries of aid. This ultimately
leads to a problem of economics and information.1 In particular, given the disconnect
between the services of humanitarian organizations and their stakeholders, donors
have difficulty in determining and comparing the quality of firms to which they would
like to contribute. At the same time, humanitarian organizations themselves have
difficulty in judging their own quality and conveying it to others. This thesis therefore
aims to identify how humanitarian organizations can better judge their performance
internally and what this means from an external market standpoint.
Part I of this thesis considers performance measurement from the perspective of
the individual humanitarian organization. Chapter 2 provides a broad overview of
the humanitarian environment, the importance of logistics activity to this sector, and
'There are a number of classic papers concerning economics theory from which this thesis draws
inspiration. Stigler (1961) considers the problem of information and the cost of search for consumers
seeking to ascertain the price of products in a market. Akerlof (1970) and Shavell (1979) explore
how markets with information asymmetries can lead to an overall reduction in product and service
quality, and in some cases market failure. Nelson (1970) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) examine
the ways information about quality can have profound effects on the structure of competitive
markets. Finally, Spence (1973) investigates how investing in the acquisition of "signals" can
convey information to others by increasing the certainty of their perceptions.
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the issues surrounding performance measurement in this context. Chapter 3 then
introduces the concept of key performance indicators (KPIs) and illustrates an ap-
proach by which humanitarian organizations can develop logistics KPIs to internally
define operational performance. In this chapter, this paper considers Heart to Heart
International, a humanitarian organization specializing in the provision of medical
relief, as a case study in how this approach can be practically implemented.
Part II then discusses the concepts of performance and quality in the context
of the humanitarian marketplace. Chapter 4 compares market trends as depicted
in academic and organizational literature with those identified using data derived
from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 990, with the ultimate goal of char-
acterizing the competitive nature of the humanitarian marketplace. Chapter 5 then
examines potential performance measurement policies from institutional and govern-
mental perspectives that focus on improving market mechanisms in this environment.
Additionally, this chapter discusses whether KPIs used by humanitarian non-profits
can serve as external signals of quality to stakeholders. Lastly, Chapter 6 completes
this thesis by summarizing its conclusions and identifying further avenues of research.
17
Part I
Measuring the Performance of
Humanitarian Relief Organizations
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Chapter 2
Humanitarian Action, Logistics,
and Performance
"Humanitarianism is the act of people helping people. It is a service, a calling,
an expression of human solidarity. It involves not only a philosophy but also a set
of deliverables. An expression of ethical concern, humanitarianism is also a business
driven by market forces and by agencies seeking to maintain and expand market share.
This arena has a few saints, a great many dedicated humanitarian professionals, and
not a few hustling entrepreneurs, fly-by-nighters, freebooters, and purveyors of snake-
oil."
-Smillie and Minear (2004, pp. 11)
This chapter provides a broad overview of the international relief system, the
importance of logistics to humanitarian activity, and the concerns that organizations
face in attempting to measure the performance and quality of their operations. First,
the concept of humanitarian relief, the actors involved, a brief history of humanitar-
ian action, and the current state of philosophy in this sector are introduced. Second,
logistics is defined as a science particularly important to humanitarian relief, and
19
the main processes and difficulties involved in humanitarian logistics are discussed.
Finally, this chapter presents performance measurement in the humanitarian envi-
ronment, the inherent difficulties that surround it, and current approaches used by
humanitarian organizations and organizations in general to evaluate performance.
2.1 Humanitarianism and the international relief
system
At the core of its philosophy, humanitarianism refers to people helping other people.
It is an idea that is often presented in terms of the altruistic tendencies in man that, as
Smith (1790) argues, exist inherently as a principle of nature. Altruism-the concern
for the welfare of others-is a concept that has been discussed and theorized in a
wide range of academic fields, including psychology (Batson, 1991), anthropology
(Wright, 1994), and economics (Andreoni, 2006). In the humanitarian context, it
connotes "individuals giving unto others without expecting anything in return, and
potentially sacrificing something in the process" (Barnett and Weiss, 2008a, pp. 11).
2.1.1 What is humanitarian relief and who is involved?
Humanitarian relief is one of three subsets of foreign aid in general, the other two
being technical aid and institution-building (Smith, 1990).1 Specifically, humani-
tarian relief refers to "the aid and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering
and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergen-
cies" (Development Initiatives, 2012). What separates it from technical aid and
'Technical aid concerns, for example, the support of training and education, population control,
and basic physical infrastructure, while institution-building refers to the support of development
programs that aim to strengthen local communities (Smith, 1990).
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institution-building is that relief is short-term in nature and guided by the principles
of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and independence. 2
Traditionally, humanitarian relief is associated with actions taken in response
to humanitarian crises, such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti and the current food
crisis in the Sahel region of West Africa. This includes material relief assistance
and services (e.g., shelter, water, and medicine), food provision, relief coordination,
population protection, and other support activities (Development Initiatives, 2012).
Additionally, humanitarian relief can include reconstruction and rehabilitation oper-
ations to repair pre-existing infrastructure post-crisis, as well as disaster prevention
and preparedness (Development Initiatives, 2012).
Within the humanitarian aid sector there are five main sets of actors-United
Nations institutions, governmental aid agencies, international non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs), members of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movements, and
local NGOs based in the countries facing crisis (Smillie and Minear, 2004). Each
actor in this environment has their own set of goals and processes, though these will
often overlap. For instance, international NGOs, the general public, and governmen-
tal aid agencies, such as the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), will fund local and international NGOs to carry out relief work. Thus, the
international relief system consists of a complicated array of network interactions, as
depicted in Figure 2-1 and adapted from Macrae (2002, pp. 12). When specifically
observing funding mechanisms of the aid sector, this can contribute to difficulties
in following the flow of money as it trickles down the humanitarian chain from first
2Jean Pictet, former Vice President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and
one of the main architects of the 1949 Geneva Conventions initially identified the seven principles of
humanitarianism that are still cited today-humanity, impartiality, neutrality, independence, volun-
tary service, unity, and universality. The first four are considered to form the "core" humanitarian
principles (Barnett and Weiss, 2008a).
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level recipients of aid, through contracting organizations, en route to beneficiaries.
Figure 2-1: The international relief system
In particular, this thesis will focus on international non-profit NGOs operating
in the United States,3 which will occasionally be referred to generically as "firms,"
competing for funds in the humanitarian marketplace. There are a number of reasons
for selecting this subset as a research focus. First, it would be problematic to gen-
eralize trends across a combination of local NGOs, international NGOs, government
agencies, Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, and UN institutions. Second, of this
group of actors, international NGOs are selected on the basis of their importance
in the humanitarian sector-notably, approximately 60 percent of all humanitarian
assistance funding is managed by international NGOs (Smillie and Minear, 2004).
Third, non-profit NGOs are considered in specific, since the vast majority of human-
3The term "operating in the United States" refers to non-profit NGOs that receive tax-exempt
status from the United States government. It is not to be confused with NGOs that are involved
with humanitarian work within the United States.
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itarian NGOs are founded as non-profits to better market themselves as purveyors
of social goods and to claim tax-exempt status.4 Finally, this thesis only focuses on
non-profit NGOs that operate in the United States, as the US maintains the most
comprehensive repository of non-profit data in the world through IRS filings. Ad-
ditionally, the United States and its donating public has consistently served as the
largest donor to humanitarian causes in the world by a factor of three to four (Randel
and German, 2002, pp. 20).
2.1.2 A brief history of humanitarian action
The philosophy of humanitarianism has changed dramatically over the past one hun-
dred years, mostly in response to changing global socioeconomic and political en-
vironments. The three defining periods in the humanitarian sector, according to
Barnett and Weiss (2008a), are from the early nineteenth century through World
War II, from 1945 through the end of the Cold War, and from 1990 to today.
The early nineteenth century through World War II
The humanitarian system prior to World War II was largely grounded in religious
ideologies, made up of intellectuals, politicians, jurists, and members of the clergy
who "adopted the language of humanitarianism to describe their proposed social and
political reforms and to push for public interventions to alleviate suffering and re-
store society's moral basis" (Barnett and Weiss, 2008a, pp. 21). Additionally, some
humanitarian relief organizations during this time period, such as Catholic Relief
4 1n addition to certain tax privileges, Glaeser (2006) summarizes the two other primary differ-
ences between non-profit and for-profit firms. First, non-profits are bounded by the nondistribution
constraint, which prevents them from disbursing any profits to owners or employees. Second, non-
profits do not have owners-their boards are self-perpetuating and not accountable to shareholders.
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Services (CRS) and Caritas Internationalis, evolved out of overseas missionary activ-
ities, seeing their work as "straddling the church and the secular world, combining
social and religious goals" (Stoddard, 2003, pp. 1). To this day, many of the largest
and most influential NGOs provide religion as a basis for their work-for instance,
World Vision International and Food For The Poor, two of the largest international
relief NGOs in terms of revenue, are religiously-affiliated.
1945 through the end of the Cold War
The experience of two World Wars triggered a new period in humanitarianism in
which many of the most familiar non- and inter-governmental organizations today
came into being, such as Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), Cooperative for Assistance
and Relief Everywhere (CARE), and AmeriCares. Barnett and Weiss (2008a, pp.
23) argue that atrocities carried out during World War II, including the Holocaust,
concentration camps, firebombings, and the use of nuclear weapons, empowered a
call by diplomats and activists for "the protection of civilians, the dispossessed, and
human dignity." The end of World War II also saw the emergence of industrialized
nations and what was to become the "third-world" or "global south" (Barnett and
Weiss, 2008a, pp. 23). The combination of these two factors-war and inequality-
provided a new awareness of global development and humanitarian issues.
1990 to today
The end of the Cold War saw a dramatic increase in the volume of humanitarian
aid organizations and funding for a variety of reasons. First, Fearon (2008) suggests
that the sharp rise in emergency aid during this period reflected a change in foreign
policy amongst the world powers to that of "neotrusteeship," or "postmodern impe-
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rialism." Neotrusteeship, as described by Fearon and Laitin (2004, pp. 7), involves
the external "control over domestic political authority and basic economic functions
[in other states]... by a hodgepodge of foreign powers, international and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), and domestic institutions." Fearon (2008) argues that
neotrusteeship policies arose as the concept of development bled into that of security
in the early 1990s-that is, spillover effects from conflicts in some states, such as
refugees and economic instability, provided sufficient motivation for intervention by
others.5 Thus, the rise of aid can be explained as a consequence of shifting foreign
policy priorities, particularly in the United States and European Union.
Related to this line of reasoning, Barnett and Weiss (2008a, pp. 24) claim that
the increase in humanitarian activity since the end of the Cold War was perpetuated
by an expanded definition of a "threat to international peace and security," which
serves as a trigger to involve the United Nations (UN) Security Council:
"After the cold war-and in reaction to the growing perception that domestic
conflict and civil wars were leaving hundreds of thousands of people at risk, creating
mass flight, and destabilizing entire regions-the council authorized interventions on
the grounds that war-induced disasters imperiled regional and international security."
This change was brought on by a report issued in 1992 by then Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, titled An Agenda For Peace, which put forth the idea that
human security included social and economic determinants of violence in addition
to the purely physical (Macrae, 2002).6 With this doctrine in place, states consider-
,Examples of foreign powers engaging in policies of neotrusteeship include United States and
European interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo in the late 1990s, East Timor in 1999 and 2006, Sierra
Leone from 1999 to 2002, Iraq from 2003 to 2011, and Afghanistan from 2001 until today.
6Macrae (2002) provides a complete explanation for how humanitarianism, development, and
social issues merged with security into what she calls the "new security agenda." There are three
major implications that come with this new ideology. First, she argues that the international com-
munity lost leverage over internal conflicts as the United States and former Soviet Union withdrew
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ing humanitarian and peacekeeping operations were therefore accompanied by (and
perhaps emboldened by) a new legal justification to do so.
In addition to changes in the political environment, global awareness of human-
itarian issues has grown due to an increase in the number of humanitarian organi-
zations soliciting funds as well as improvements in technology. For example, Fearon
(2008) argues that another explanation for the dramatic increase in aid besides shift-
ing foreign policy priorities is that the humanitarian sector has self-expanded as a
result of its highly competitive nature. Technological innovation has also played a
significant impact by increasing international awareness of humanitarian causes, es-
pecially thanks to improvements in real-time media coverage 7 and the Internet, which
provides individuals better access to information about emergencies, disasters, and
crises, as well as the humanitarian organizations that seek donations.
2.1.3 The current environment
The Development Initiatives (2012) report on global humanitarian assistance pro-
vides a comprehensive outlook regarding the scale and scope of humanitarian action
today. For the most part, the overall level of spending is driven by large-scale disas-
ters and conflicts that call upon the international community as a whole, including
foreign governments, international NGOs, and military actors. In 2010, for instance,
the earthquake in Haiti and massive floods in Pakistan drove up international spend-
ing on humanitarian aid by 23% over the previous year; however, the lack of a major
political and financial support from third-world states. Second, armed groups involved in conflicts
today are respecting less and less the international rule of law, resulting in extreme violence against
civilians as well as challenging humanitarian relief environments. Third, the variability in political
and military responses to such conflicts has become virtually unpredictable, and as a consequence
there is no clear basis for if, when, and how to intervene in another state's affairs.
'Bernard Kouchner, the founder of M6decins Sans Frontieres (MSF), refers to the impact of the
media on fundraising appeal as la loi du tapage, or "the law of hype" (Aldashev and Verdier, 2009).
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crisis in the following year saw overall funding fall by 9%, from an estimated US$18.8
billion in 2010 to US$17.1 billion in 2011.8
Historically the United States has been the largest donor to humanitarian efforts,
providing over a third of total relief funding from government sources between 2001
and 2010 (Development Initiatives, 2012). In 2010 the US government committed
US$4.9bn to humanitarian causes, followed by the European Union with US$1.7bn
and the United Kingdom with US$943m (Development Initiatives, 2012, pp. 13).
Of all states receiving aid, those that are affected by conflict are given the most
attention-on average, between 64 and 83 percent of international humanitarian
assistance between 2001 and 2010 was given to countries in conflict or "post-conflict
transition" (Development Initiatives, 2012). Over this same period, funding was
largely concentrated among a small group of recipients, with the top 20 recipients of
aid receiving 75% of the funding and the top 3 alone receiving 25% (Development
Initiatives, 2012, pp. 29). Of course, international assistance varies not only by
volume but also by type. In Afghanistan, for example, over one-third of humanitarian
efforts go to reconstruction relief, while in Ethiopia the vast majority of relief (roughly
80%) is in the form of emergency food aid (Development Initiatives, 2012).
The United States in particular takes a pragmatic rather than idealistic approach
when it comes to humanitarian aid. Following the end of World War II, the United
States was initially "unapologetic about its use of aid for political purposes" (Stod-
dard, 2002, pp. 39-40). This mentality slightly subsided during the Cold War, yet
reappeared during the 1990s when the US began experimenting with the concept of
8The bulk of humanitarian efforts in 2011 were made up of continued responses to either
long-term crisis, such as in Sudan and Palestine, or immediate reconstruction relief, such as in
Afghanistan and Haiti. The volume of humanitarian funding often travels sinusoidally in response
to sudden disasters, conflicts, or other emergencies, yet consistently with an upwards trend due to
what is referred to as the "ratchet-effect" (Development Initiatives, 2012; Macrae, 2002).
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Table 2.1: Top 20 recipients of international humanitarian aid, 2001-2010
Rank Country
1 Sudan
2 Palestine
3 Afghanistan
4 Ethiopia
5 Iraq
6 Pakistan
7 Haiti
8 Democratic
of the Congo
9 Somalia
10 Indonesia
Republic
Total Aid
US$9.7bn
US$6.5
US$5.6bn
US$5.3bn
US$5.2bn
US$4.6bn
US$3.7bn
US$3.7bn
US$2.7bn
US$2.4bn
Rank Country
11 Kenya
12 Sri Lanka
13 Zimbabwe
14 Lebanon
15 Uganda
16 Chad
17 Jordan
18 Angola
19 Burundi
20 Myanmar
Source: Development Initiatives (2012, pp. 30)
using humanitarian means to establish security and peace in other parts of the world.
The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s serve as clear examples where the
US has used humanitarian efforts, specifically in reconstruction and development, in
an effort to build democratic states that can function self-sufficiently.
This pragmatic attitude has also spilled over to NGOs that operate in the United
States. Stoddard (2003) argues that, of the three historical strains of modern hu-
manitarian action, US NGOs fall into the category of 'Wilsonian,' named for Pres-
ident Woodrow Wilson who used aid as a way to project US values and influence.
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Total Aid
US$1.9bn
US$1.8bn
US$1.7bn
US$1.7bn
US$1.6bn
US$1.4bn
US$1.3bn
US$1.2bn
US$1.2bn
US$1bn
Wilsonian organizations, according to Stoddard (2003), have a "practical, opera-
tional bent," as opposed to religious organizations, or 'Dunantists,' named for ICRC
founder Henry Dunant, who position themselves outside of state interests. As a re-
sult, US humanitarian NGOs today are "focused on the logistical and technical tasks
of aid and intent on maximizing efficiency within the short-term operational setting
of an emergency" (Stoddard, 2003, pp. 2).
Other defining features of the current humanitarian environment include im-
proved information technology, communications, and logistics capabilities (Barnett
and Weiss, 2008a). Furthermore, in regards to funding, the philanthropic world as
a whole took a significant hit in response to the 2007 and 2008 financial crisis. Ac-
cording to the Urban Institute, the largest declines in charitable giving occurred in
2008 and 2009, and while there was modest growth in 2010 and 2011, giving has not
yet reached pre-recession levels (Blackwood et al., 2012, pp. 4). Of all types of char-
ities, international and foreign affairs organizations experienced the most significant
reduction in growth-from 2000 to 2005, revenues grew on average 71%; from 2005
to 2010, they grew only 11% (Blackwood et al., 2012, pp. 4).
2.1.4 Paradoxes in the international relief sector
Why give?
Contemporary humanitarian philosophy recognizes that humanitarian action is no
longer considered a "moral necessity," in large part due to the limited availability of
resources to address crises as well as the complex and dangerous nature of humani-
tarian working environments (Barnett and Weiss, 2008a). In the same light, the idea
that the contributions of individuals, corporations, foundations, and governments to
humanitarian relief are devoid of all self-interest is, for the most part, abandoned.
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Besides a real concern for the welfare of beneficiaries, donors to humanitarian causes
give for three categories of reason-psychological comfort, business interests, and
political influence.
In his work on the economics of philanthropy, James Andreoni highlights the
difficulty in rationalizing self-interest, an economic assumption inherent to human
behavior, with unselfish giving. In his own words (Andreoni, 2006, pp. 1204):
"Philanthropy is one of the greatest puzzles for economists. A science based on
precepts of self-interested behavior does not easily accommodate behavior that is so
clearly unselfish."
To justify the existence of philanthropy, Andreoni (1989, 1990) develops a theory
of impure altruism where, in an economic sense, one party transfers a form of welfare
to another while deriving utility from the act of giving. Andreoni refers to this as
"warm-glow giving," and thus explains philanthropy to exist in a state somewhere
between pure altruism and pure egoism. In stark terms, people give because it makes
them feel good.
A number of authors also cite financial and business interests in charitable action.
From an individual perspective, Andreoni (2006) highlights the fact that charity
is tax deductible, and becomes particularly attractive to wealthy individuals who
gain a higher marginal subsidy from philanthropy given progressive tax rates. Marx
(1999) and Porter and Kramer (2002) argue that businesses themselves can target
donations to meet corporate goals and objectives, improving the competitive context
of the giving firm by demonstrating awareness and commitment to social causes.
Further, Wang et al. (2008) identify a quantitative relationship between corporate
philanthropic giving and financial performance, observing that philanthropy provides
returns to the giving firm on a similar level with advertising and promotion.
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Charitable contributions can also be made to impose political influence, partic-
ularly by donating governments. For instance, Stoddard (2002) argues that policy-
makers leveraged the North Korean famine in 1995 to extract political concessions
in exchange for food aid, while in Serbia during the late 1990s both the United
States and European Union targeted aid to specific municipalities in order to em-
power certain population segments. In regards to when humanitarian action is of
interest to foreign governments, Smillie and Minear (2004) identify three "classes"
of emergencies. A "first-class" emergency-like those in Bosnia and Kosovo in the
1990s, and Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s-constitute high-profile crises where a
preeminent political or security interest is taken by one or more of the major powers.
"Second-class" emergencies constitute more traditional kinds of crises that attract
an intermediate level of interest and involvement. At the bottom of the spectrum
lie "third-class" emergencies, where involvement is low due to a lack of interest or
any other compelling reason for action. Ultimately, Smillie and Minear (2004) argue
that the very existence of third-class emergencies demonstrates that the humanitar-
ian system is in violation of its core principles. 9
Aid abundance
Though many within and outside the humanitarian relief and development com-
munities are aware that foreign aid is a scarce resource, there additionally exists
9Identifying ulterior motives for giving is not meant in any way to convince the reader that
people do not give to humanitarian causes for reasons of kindness and compassion for their fellow
man; however, it is meant to demonstrate that motivations of self-interest, business, and influence
are also at play. This is important to understand when discussing the importance of performance
measurement for humanitarian non-profits. Donors today rarely give for the sake of giving-instead,
most expect some form of return for their charity and are therefore increasingly interested in the
impact that specific humanitarian organizations can deliver. It should be noted that this trend is
positive for recipients of aid-if the best organizations receive the majority of contributions, then
more relief can be passed on to those in need.
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concerns that procedures and standards of performance for humanitarian organiza-
tions leads to a term described by Tendler (1975) as "aid abundance." The more
familiar concept-that of "aid scarcity"-refers to the large gap between the amount
of aid demanded and that which is supplied. Aid abundance, on the other hand,
exists equally in this market and refers to the inefficient allocation of relief resources
that result from the institutional environment from which aid is distributed.
Tendler argues that aid abundance has two distinct yet reinforcing causes. First,
she observes that there is a tendency for both donors and recipients to gravitate
toward projects with large foreign exchange components. As a result, the importation
of equipment from the donor to the recipient country is encouraged, even though the
recipient could have made the equipment itself. Second, and more importantly,
Tendler (1975, pp. 56) notes that organizational bureaucracies favor large projects
over small ones, largely due to the fact that the definition of output is often given in
terms of the quantity of resources transferred. In her words:
"The output of [sic] public sector organization[s], that is, seems to have been de-
fined in terms of the total amount of resources successfully transferred during any pe-
riod; input is the staff work, measured in time, necessary to transfer a given amount...
A larger project requires less staff time per dollar transferred than a smaller one, so
there is a tendency for the financing organization to gravitate toward larger projects.
This tendency exists, moreover, even in organizations not under the pressure of an
annual appropriations funding mechanism - i.e., the need to 'get rid of the money'
before the end of a fiscal year."
Thus, humanitarian organizations are incentivized to maximize the distribution
of resources, and not necessarily impact. In turn, the recipients of aid-including
foreign governments and individuals themselves-are often unable to absorb what is
given to them. Thus, when made available, aid is often distributed inefficiently.
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Is humanitarian aid good?
Certainly the obvious answer to whether or not humanitarian aid is a beneficial
good is yes, aid provides people who cannot be sufficiently supported by their own
governments or communities the help they need when they need it most. At the
same time, however, there are a number of complications in regards to the delivery
of relief that pose serious problems for the humanitarian community.
For one, the way in which aid is delivered is important when considering its
benefit to societies in the long-term. Aid that promises solutions in the short-term
while ignoring the fundamental reasons for why states cannot support themselves
can raise questions concerning the value of such relief. Barnett and Weiss (2008b,
pp. 147-48) describe this mentality as being destructive to humanitarian efforts:
"... a strategy that delivers aid first and asks questions later (if ever) might be
so focused on the highly visible short term that it can cause more harm than good
to the populations that it seeks to serve. This was the situation faced by many
aid workers in complex humanitarian emergencies. Aid not only saved lives, it also
fueled conflict and repression by supporting repressive governments, feeding warring
factions through theft or gatekeeping access to aid, helping to militarize refugee camps,
enabling warring groups to exercise control over populations, legitimizing governments
and rebels, and allowing outside states to appear to be doing something about a crisis
without having to intervene in more effective ways... Aid, moreover, can increase
distortions of the local economy, displace or discourage local economic activity, create
a short-term hothouse aid economy, produce new kinds of dependencies, and reinforce
existing political and economic inequalities."
Zanotti (2010) provides a real world example of this occurring in the aftermath
of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. She argues that, during the lead-up to the crisis,
international NGOs in Haiti aggravated the state's fragility by serving as substitutes
for government institutions. As a consequence, NGOs compounded rather than
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reduced the problems for the Haitian people as their own government was incapable
of providing services and security within its domain post-disaster.
Additionally, humanitarian NGOs, like all organizations, can be fallible creations.
An article from The Economist (1998) argues that non-profits face issues of account-
ability, finding competent line managers, and training that become more prevalent as
these firms are more ingrained in society. Non-profits also face issues of transparency,
high rates of employee turnover, and difficulties in coordination when responding to a
crisis. In some cases, there have been instances of fraud and other behavioral issues
amongst the largest and smallest humanitarian relief organizations. For instance,
the UN's Oil-for-Food Programme, established in 1995 to allow Iraq to sell oil on
the world market in exchange for humanitarian goods, suffered from widespread cor-
ruption and abuse in the form of kickbacks for oil sales contracts (Volcker et al.,
2005); on the other end of the spectrum, humanitarian workers of 40 NGOs during
the early 2000s were accused of extorting sex in exchange for aid supplies with over
1500 children and adults in West African refugee camps (Naik, 2002).o
2.2 Humanitarian logistics
Logistics serves a critical function in the delivery of humanitarian relief by bridging
those in need with those that want to help. As the field of logistics and supply chain
management has grown substantially in interest over the last few decades in the
business world, humanitarian organizations have also been increasingly incorporating
logistics concepts into their operations.
10It is important to note that even though high profile cases such as these force the humanitarian
community and the public in general to ask questions about the benefits of aid, the overwhelming
majority of relief activity is performed by good people with the intent of assisting those in need.
Instead of raising controversy, this discussion is meant to highlight the distance created between
donor and humanitarian relief provider.
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2.2.1 Logistics and supply chain management
Russell (2005) notes that the term logistics signifies the optimization of physical,
informational, and financial flows through a supply chain network. A typical supply
chain consists of five broadly defined actors-suppliers, manufacturers, distributors,
retailers, and customers. Logistics therefore concerns the efficient and effective flow
of materials from suppliers, through each actor, en route to the final recipient.
It is useful to look at logistics from both a process and functional perspective. A
process view concerns macro interactions between the actors in a supply chain. Typi-
cally this consists of customer order, replenishment, manufacturing, and procurement
cycles. A functional view, on the other hand, looks at the more specific actions that
are necessary to complete an order. These include purchasing and procurement, in-
ventory control, warehousing, materials handling, order processing, transportation,
customer service, and planning, amongst others (Caplice and Sheffi, 2012).
Recent academic literature on logistics explores its overall importance to busi-
ness as well as how supply chains can be managed. For instance, Beamon (1998)
cites the rising costs of manufacturing, shortened product life cycles, and the glob-
alization of market economies as the foundation for increasing interest in supply
chain management, and goes on to identify performance measurement, optimiza-
tion, and modeling issues worthy of future research. Daugherty et al. (1998) argue
for a strong link between logistics capabilities and customer satisfaction, specifically
observing that personal products vendors who establish customer satisfaction and
loyalty through logistics service acquire greater market share. Additionally, Vick-
ery et al. (2003) observe that supply chain integration is indirectly related to firm
financial performance through its impact on customer service.
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2.2.2 Humanitarian logistics and complicating factors
Logistics serves as one of the most important functions of humanitarian relief or-
ganizations, in addition to, for instance marketing and fundraising, monitoring and
evaluation, and customer and supplier relations. In the humanitarian context, lo-
gistics is ultimately about "delivering the right supplies to the right people, at the
right place, at the right time, and in the right quantities" (Russell, 2005, pp. 37). It
concerns a variety of stakeholders, including donors, government actors, militaries,
humanitarian NGOs, and the final recipients of aid. Due to the complex nature
of disasters, humanitarian logistics is difficult to carry out and at the same time
uncompromisingly essential to saving human lives.
Thomas (2004, as cited in Russell, 2005) defines ten processes essential to hu-
manitarian relief chains, as seen in Figure 2-2-(1) planning and preparedness, (2)
assessment, (3) resource mobilization, (4) procurement, (5) transport, (6) tracking
and tracing, (7) stock asset management, (8) extended point of delivery and relief to
beneficiaries, (9) monitoring, evaluation and reporting, and (10) communications and
collaboration. Additionally, he defines physical, informational, and financial flows of
resources through this chain. Physical logistics concerns the railroads, vehicles, ocean
liners, and aviation carriers required to transport aid from donors, through NGOs
and suppliers, to beneficiaries. Informational flows include the knowledge that is
acquired and shared between donors, local and international suppliers, NGOs, and
recipients of aid. Finally, financial logistics involves the flow of cash, grants, and
gifts-in-kind" from donors, NGOs, and suppliers to beneficiaries.
There has been a surge of interest in the field of humanitarian logistics, partic-
"Gifts-in-kind (also known as in-kind gifts or in-kind donations) are a form of charitable giving
where goods and services are directly provided, rather than money. For example, a pharmaceutical
company may donate pain medication in-kind to a humanitarian organization, which may then
repackage this gift with the intent of distributing it to beneficiaries.
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Relief Chain
Figure 2-2: The humanitarian relief chain
ularly since the mid-2000s. Van Wassenhove (2006) comments on the importance
of logistics and supply chain management to humanitarian relief organizations, out-
lining the need for humanitarian relief chains to be agile, adaptable, and aligned.
Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) discuss the nature of the humanitarian supply chain,
also commenting on the importance of agility, and in particular the need to capture
large amounts of funding at short notice to provide emergency assistance. Kovics
and Spens (2007) distinguish actors, phases, and logistical processes of humanitar-
ian disaster relief, recommending that humanitarian logisticians can further draw
on tools used by those in business. Furthermore, Holguin-Veras et al. (2012) ar-
gue that humanitarian logistics is too broad a term to fit into a single definition of
operational conditions, with long-term assistance at one end of the spectrum and
immediate post-disaster relief at the other.
Complicating factors
Though logistics operations in the humanitarian sector can draw on ideas from the
business world, there are a number of features unique to humanitarian organizations
and the environment in which they function that make logistics activities particularly
complicated. These issues have been discussed at length by many others in previ-
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ous literature (Davidson, 2006; Holguin-Veras et al., 2012; Kovacs and Spens, 2009;
Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Smillie and Minear, 2004; Stoddard, 2003; Van Wassen-
hove, 2006). Broadly speaking, they can be broken up into three main categories-
organizational, operational, and environmental-as seen in Table 2.2.
Organizational complications include those factors internal to humanitarian orga-
nizations themselves, and in specific NGOs, that make logistics activity difficult. For
example, humanitarian organizations experience a high rate of employee turnover in
response to the emotional and physical demands of their work, which impacts the
overall operational familitarity of the organization. Additionally, the vast majority
of humanitarian relief organizations are non-profits and thus face external pressures
to focus resources on maximizing value to recipients of humanitarian aid rather than
on internal process improvements.
Operational factors refer to those external to the organization that directly impact
logistics and supply chain functions. These include uncertainties in demand and
supply, as well as dramatic time pressures due to the suddenness of emergencies.
Furthermore, these include difficulties in acquiring data throughout operations, and
coordinating activities across multiple organizations.
Finally, environmental factors are those that complicate the humanitarian system
in general. For instance, humanitarian organizations are tasked to carry out their
actions with neutrality and impartiality in mind, 2 yet they work alongside actors
such as foreign governments, militaries, the media, and beneficiaries themselves which
can make this difficult to accomplish. In addition, the majority of humanitarian
12Van Wassenhove (2006, pp. 479) discusses the difficulties in adhering to the humanitarian
principles in complex environments, especially that of an armed conflict: "Any compromise on
the humanitarian principles, such as using aid to secure the victory of one side over another,
would nullify the intent of the operation and take out of the ethical context and mandate of the
participating organization. Humanitarian work cannot judge the conflict; it can only judge the
extent to which the conflict is affecting civilians."
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efforts take place in third-world countries and those in conflict, often posing unique
physical, geographic, and security demands.
Table 2.2: Concerns for humanitarian logistics
Organizational Operational Environmental
Lack of resources and invest- Uncertainty in demand, sup- Political and security con-
ment in infrastructure ply, and needs assessment cerns
High staff turnover Inability to predict when dis- Interactions with multiple
asters occur and of what type stakeholders
Lack of depth of knowledge Data acquisition Need to follow humanitarian
principles
Organizational culture Time pressures Physical and geographic de-
mands
2.3 Measuring the performance of humanitarian
activity
There are three ways to consider performance measurement in the humanitarian
sector. The first concerns the macro performance of relief-that is, how well does
aid help the people it intends to. This is mainly important for governments that
donate large sums to relief and development activities in foreign countries, expecting
that their contributions are put to good use. The second way of looking at this issue
and the focus of this thesis is at the micro level, and concerns how humanitarian firms,
and specifically non-profit NGOs, can evaluate their operational performance. The
third way, which is not discussed at length in this thesis, is through monitoring and
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evaluation (M&E). While a critical function of humanitarian organizations, M&E is
differentiated from performance measurement as discussed here since it is a process
regulated by donors onto NGOs and is highly specific to individual NGOs and their
individual operations.
2.3.1 Why is it important?
Measuring performance is a key issue for humanitarian relief organizations and the
non-profit community in general. As a recent article in The Economist (2011) ad-
mits, "far too many philanthropists and non-profits shy away from setting goals and
measuring progress... [and as] a result they condemn themselves to ineffectiveness."
In this light, both goal-setting and performance evaluation should be regarded as a
means for self-improvement.
Internally, performance measurement schemes can be used by humanitarian orga-
nizations to spot strengths and weaknesses in operational and financial environments.
These are important to functional departments within these organizations as well as
management. From the functional level, departments can use indicators of perfor-
mance to spot trends in where they are improving or where they are falling behind
in order to make adjustments in their operations-for example, the warehouse team
may observe that their dock-to-stock (DTS) time" has increased over the last few
months, and knowing this, looks to reasons why this has occurred. On the other
end of the spectrum, performance indicators can also be used by the front office
to guide corporate strategy and business focus. For instance, a firm might notice
that it performs best at receiving and redistributing gifts-in-kind, and subsequently
"Dock-to-stock (DTS) time will be discussed further in Chapter 3. It is defined as the time
(usually in days) between when a shipment arrives at the dock of a warehouse to when it is stocked
in the warehouse. Short DTS times are an indication that the warehouse team is performing well
in processing incoming receipts.
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chooses to market itself for these type of contributions as opposed to straight cash.
Of course, trends in performance must be analyzed with respect to any unique and
ulterior events that might underlie the data. If it was the mishandling of one large
shipment that skewed that month's performance results, this should be considered
before making serious changes in organizational policy.
Performance measurement is also important from an external standpoint. Legally,
non-profits are required to maintain at least high-level data concerning financial
transactions, such as revenue and expense streams, which are included in their IRS
Form 990 and produced publically. Indicators of performance can also be used volun-
tarily to distribute to stakeholders and the public in general. For instance, Davidson
(2006) argues that indicators can be presented to donors to increase the transparency
of the non-profit and signify their willingness to be held accountable for their opera-
tional performance. Furthermore, performance indicators can be used as a means to
convey strengths to others, and can thus serve as a marketing tool to help capture
funding for future programs. For example, Heart to Heart International, a humani-
tarian NGO based in Kansas that will officially be introduced in Chapter 3, commits
an extremely high percentage of contributions directly to relief and development pro-
grams, which it highlights on its website." This notification essentially serves as an
indication of organizational quality, conveying a degree of trust to potential donors.
2.3.2 Why is it difficult?
Measuring the performance of humanitarian activity is challenging for a variety of
reasons. First, the metrics that matter most tend to be the most difficult to acquire.
This is largely due to the nature of non-profit activity, which usually involves the
"See www.hearttoheart.org/about-us/financials (accessed 21 January 2013).
41
provision of social goods that are fundamentally difficult to quantify. In discussing
the importance of developing meaningful performance measurement systems for non-
profits in general, Sawhill and Williamson (2001, pp. 371) highlight this point:
"Imagine an organization whose mission is to alleviate human suffering. How can
you measure such an abstract notion? How can an organization meaningfully assess
its direct contribution to such a broadly stated mission? And by whose criteria should
success be measured?"
Second, those factors that make the humanitarian environment complicated in
general terms also contribute to difficulties in measuring the performance of relief
organizations. As observed by Davidson (2006, pp. 10), these include:
" Lack of centrally-captured data from operations
" Limited information technology infrastructure
* Lack of funding for IT infrastructure
" Variability / chaotic environment after each disaster
" External factors (e.g. geography, state response, etc.)
" Lack of incentive for measurement in non-profit sector
" Potential negative media exposure
" Human resources issues
" Organizational culture
" Long-term vs. short-term goals of disaster response
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2.3.3 Performance measurement literature review
Despite these complicating factors, a number of approaches to measuring the perfor-
mance of humanitarian action have been proposed in recent literature. This thesis
looks to ideas from a few of these approaches, as well as others that concern gen-
eral logistics performance to serve as a foundation for establishing a performance
measurement system for Heart to Heart International in the following chapter.
Beamon and Balcik (2008)
In "Performance Measurement in Humanitarian Relief Chains," Beamon and Balcik
(2008) develop an approach that allows humanitarian NGOs to select various metrics
to evaluate their supply chain performance.
Individual metrics for humanitarian logistics operations are first identified and
categorized under three dimensions of performance-resource management, output,
and flexibility. Their approach then suggests that an NGO choose at least one metric
from each of these three dimensions and evaluate the system as a whole given the
following four criteria:
" Inclusiveness-measurement of all pertinent aspects
" Universality-allow for comparison under various operating conditions
" Measurability-data required are measurable
" Consistency-measures are consistent with organizational goals
The authors argue that by establishing and making improvements in performance
measurement systems, NGOs delivering humanitarian aid will be better positioned
to make strategic decisions and address questions of accountability and transparency.
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Caplice and Sheffi (1994)
In "A Review and Evaluation of Logistics Metrics," Caplice and Sheffi (1994) provide
an approach to evaluate performance indicators for organizations involved in logistics
and supply chain operations in general. The authors aggregate characteristics of
individual performance metrics identified as critical by previous researchers into a set
of eight criteria-validity, robustness, usefulness, integration, economy, compatibility,
level of detail, and behavioral soundness 15-and categorize existing metrics into three
primary forms of measurement:
" Utilization-input usage that is usually presented as a ratio or percentage of the actual
amout of an input used to some norm value (i.e., Actual inut)Norm input
" Productivity-transformational efficiency that is typically reported as the ratio of actual
outputs produced to actual inputs consumed (i.e., Actualoutput)Actual input
* Effectiveness--quality of process output that is typically reported as a ratio of actual output
to some predetermined norm or competitive standard (i.e., Atu output )
Another purpose of this paper is to identify the inevitable trade-offs that arise
when designing an individual metric. In particular, the authors highlight the fact
that a single metric cannot satisfy all characteristics that make up an organization's
performance. The main trade-offs suggested are those between integration and use-
fulness, and robustness and validity.
i"From Caplice and Sheffi (1994, pp. 14), integration implies that the metric includes all relevant
aspects of the process and promotes coordination across functions and divisions. Usefulness implies
the metric is readily understandable by the decision maker and provides a guide for action to be
taken. Robustness implies the metric is interpreted similarly by the users, is comparable across time,
location, and organizations, and is repeatable. Finally, validity implies that the metric accurately
captures the events and activities being measured and controls for any exogenous factors.
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Caplice and Sheffi (1995)
In "A Review and Evaluation of Logistics Performance Measurement Systems,"
Caplice and Sheffi (1995) turn to an approach that can be used to evaluate an
organization's performance measurement system as a whole. The authors combine
criteria obtained from supply chain management literature and company interviews
to identify six characteristics that are most relevant to evaluating such systems:
" Comprehensive-the system captures all relevant constituencies and stakeholders
* Causally oriented-the system tracks those activities and indicators that influence future
and current performance
" Vertically integrated-the system translates the overall firm strategy to all decision makers
within the organization and is connected to the proper reward system
" Horizontally integrated-the system includes all pertinent activities, functions, and depart-
ments
* Internally comparable-the system recognizes and allows for trade-offs between the different
dimensions of performance
" Useful-the system is readily understandable by the decision maker and provides a guide for
action to be taken
Ultimately, the purpose of this paper is to provide management involved in logis-
tics and supply chain decision making a means to evaluate their internal processes
in order to spot weaknesses, make improvements, and guide strategy.
Davidson (2006)
In "Key Performance Indicators in Humanitarian Logistics," Davidson (2006) reviews
best practices of performance measurement exercised by logistics functions of military
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and commercial organizations and suggests a key performance indicator (KPI) system
to be used by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC). This approach is then applied to humanitarian operations conducted by the
IFRC in response to two disasters-the Sahel Food Security Crisis of 2005 and the
South Asia Earthquake of 2005.
After interviewing employees from several departments at their headquarters in
Geneva, the author identifies that the over-arching goal of the IFRC in response to a
disaster is a timely response rather than concerns of financial efficiency alone. Given
this information, a system of four KPIs is proposed:
" Appeal coverage-expressed as (1) the percentage of the quantity of items that donors have
pledged out of the total number requested, and (2) the percentage of items that have actually
been delivered on-site out of the total number requested
" Donation-to-donation time-the median and mean amount of time it takes an item to be
delivered after a donor has pledged to donate it
" Financial efficiency-expressed as (1) the under or over budget as a percentage of budget
cost, (2) the difference between anticipated and actual budget in absolute terms, and (3) the
ratio of total transportation costs to total product costs
* Assessment accuracy-measure of change in the operation's final budget over time with
respect to the original budget
Some other important features of Davidson's proposed system include: (1) the
designation of high-priority items to be delivered during an operation, (2) the use
of specific breakpoints in time in expressing these metrics, and (3) the importance
of how to weigh various types of items in calculating the operation's overall per-
formance. Furthermore, the author notes a number of other important themes in
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humanitarian performance measurement, including the need at the outset of an op-
eration to establish delivery and financial targets, as well as the need for complete
and accurate data throughout.
Frazelle (2001)
In World-Class Warehousing and Material Handling, Frazelle (2001) identifies com-
mon benchmarks and indicators for general warehouse operations in terms of finan-
cial, productivity, quality, and cycle time performance. The author defines warehouse
benchmarking as "the process of gathering and sharing those assessments and devel-
oping an improvement plan of action based on the assessment," and cites three ways
of looking at benchmarking (Frazelle, 2001, pp. 46):
" Internal-focus on the operations of a single company
* External-look outside the firm's industry
" Competitive-look at firms conducting business in the same industry
Frazelle also introduces warehouse performance gap analysis (WPGA), which
serves as a methodology for quickly indicating a company's standing in performance
versus world-class norms. WPGA allows the firm to produce a "performance profile,"
, as seen in Figure 2-3 and adapted from Frazelle (2001, pp. 57), that compares
performance to pre-established standards.
Sawhill and Williamson (2001)
In "Mission Impossible? Measuring Success in Nonprofit Organizations," Sawhill
and Williamson (2001) discuss the importance of developing meaningful performance
measurement systems for non-profit organizations in general. The authors cite The
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Figure 2-3: Warehouse performance gap analysis
Nature Conservancy, the world's largest charitable environmental organization, as
a case study in which the implementation of a simple performance measurement
system helped the organization better measure mission impact.
The Nature Conservancy initially measured progress by adding up the number of
acres of land they had acquired and the total value of charitable donations they had
received (i.e., bucks and acres). After questioning whether these metrics actually
assessed concrete progress toward their mission of creating biodiversity, they devel-
oped a new measurement system consisting of 98 leading indicators that eventually
collapsed under its own weight. The organization then designed a new measurement
system that sought to create linkages between their mission, vision, goals, strate-
gies, and programs, adopting a family of 9 measures in three main areas that proved
successful, especially in motivating line managers:
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e Impact-mission success
e Activity-achieving goals and implementing strategies
e Capacity-mobilization of resources necessary to fulfill the mission
Ultimately, the authors note that successful performance measurement systems
of non-profits should: (1) be simple and easy to communicate, (2) be developed with
marketing in mind, and (3) measure mission-oriented goals rather than attempting
to measure mission itself.
USAID (2010)
"Selecting Performance Indicators" reviews the method by which USAID establishes
metrics to define their performance. As the United States government's international
development arm, USAID's metrics tend to illustrate high-level indications of the
welfare of foreign countries compared to metrics of NGOs-for instance, USAID
looks at private investment as a percentage of GDP, contraceptive prevalence rates,
and child mortality rates. Their criteria for indicators include:
" Direct-the indicator clearly measures the intended result
" Objective-the indicator is unambiguous about (1) what is being measured and (2) what
data are being collected
" Useful for management-the indicator provides a meaningful measure of change over time
for management decision-making
" Attributable-the indicator can be plausibly associated with USAID interventions
" Practical-data for the indicator can be collected on a timely basis and at a reasonable cost
" Adequate-the indicator is sufficient to measure the stated result
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* Disaggregated, as necessary-the indicator is modified if necessary to be applicable to rele-
vant population subsets, such as gender, age, location, and other dimensions16
Additionally, USAID (2010) argues that performance indicators are important
for keeping managers results-focused, providing objective evidence to stakeholders
that results are being achieved, and communicating achievements to host country
counterparts, other partners, and customers.
16USAID (2010) notes that disaggregation is particularly important as development programs
often affect population cohorts or institutions in different ways.
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Chapter 3
Case Study: Developing Logistics
Key Performance Indicators for
Heart to Heart International
"As resources become tighter, NGOs face new pressures for greater accountability
for program impact and quality. Today, contributors, donor agencies, scholars, and
relief and development practitioners are all asking: do NGOs practice what they
preach? How do we know? How effective are their programs and projects?"
-Lindenberg and Bryant (2001, as cited in Beamon and Balcik, 2008)
The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate an approach by which humanitarian
NGOs can develop key performance indicators (KPIs) to help judge the quality of
their logistics and supply chain operations. First, the research methodology for this
chapter is summarized, KPIs are defined, and the subject of this case study, Heart
to Heart International (HHI), is introduced. A bottom-up analysis of HHI's logistics
and supply chain data is then performed in an attempt to identify what activities are
particularly important to the organization's operations. Next, a top-down analysis
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of HHI's strategy, including their mission and objectives is performed, in order to
identify what desired outcomes regarding their logistics activities are representative of
their strategy. The proposed KPIs for HHI's logistics operations are then explained
in detail and evaluated from an individual and systems perspective. Finally, the
approach used to develop a KPI measurement system in this case is summarized.
3.1 Approach and research methodology
3.1.1 Case study design
The KPI system for HHI's logistics operations is designed using a dual-approach pro-
cess. First, a bottom-up approach to indicators is considered, taking those activities
that the organization carries out and merging them with what data is available or
could be made available in the future. This allows for a general understanding of
what operational information is important to the organization's logistics activities,
as well as what can physically be measured. Second, a top-down approach to indica-
tors considers the overall mission and objectives of the organization, in addition to
those outcomes that are representative of the organization's strategy. In between the
bottom-up and top-down approaches to indicators exist KPIs that are both relevant
to the important activities carried out by the firm that can or could be measured,
as well as the outcomes that are representative of the firm's mission and objectives.
This dynamic is shown in Figure 3-1 below.
3.1.2 Overview of key performance indicators
KPIs serve as a core set of metrics used by the acting firm to measure the effectiveness
and efficiency of the services that they provide. Though KPIs can be discussed in the
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Bottom-up approach
Mission * Identify the activities and
Objectives available data of the
Top-down app roach Outcomes 0organizationT Process what information
is important to operations
* Identify mission and Indicators
objectives of the
organization
- Select what outcomes Information
are desired given the
firm's strategy Available data
Figure 3-1: Bottom-up and top-down approaches to developing performance metrics
singular, they are usually monitored as a group. This is primarily due to the fact that
meaningful interpretations of an organization's performance within a functional area,
such as logistics, can only be made by observing multiple activities within that area.
For instance, HHI's logistics operations are made up of inbound donation processing,
inventory management, and outbound order processing, and there is no single metric
that can sufficiently aggregate information across these activities. Thus, KPIs are
best pursued and evaluated from a balanced and integrated systems perspective.
Why are KPIs useful?
KPIs provide decision makers within the organization a means to spot trends in how
it carries out activities. They are generally either presented as a singular value or
as a simple ratio, and thus can be monitored quantitatively. By observing trends in
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KPIs, assessments of the performance of the organization in various functions and
as a whole can be made. If designed correctly, KPIs are easy to calculate and can
be quickly understood and communicated to others. Though quantitative by design,
they can also be used in tandem with more qualitative data, such as monitoring and
evaluation reporting.
KPIs also serve as a useful goal-setting and benchmarking tool. The foundation
for such metrics exists in the corporate strategy of the firm, specifically in regards to
what management believes is most important to core business. Thus, organizations
can set KPIs in specific functional areas that management sees as critical to success.
For instance, if the firm heavily relies on new business, then they may choose to
monitor the number of unique incoming customers each month, in absolute terms
and as a percentage of total customers. KPIs can furthermore be used the other way
around. If an organization through its KPI system can identify areas of business
where they excel, management may choose to modify strategy appropriately.
Finally, individual KPI metrics can be used as a marketing tool to help capture fu-
ture business-in fact, Sawhill and Williamson (2001) recommend that performance
measurement systems be developed with marketing in mind. As mentioned in the
preceding chapter, HHI promotes the high percentage of donations made available
for its relief programs-which essentially serves as a KPI-on their website to convey
a sense of accountability to donors and other stakeholders.
What are their limitations?
While serving as useful indicators of performance, KPI systems are not a perfect
tool and it is important to highlight some of their limitations. First and foremost,
performance metrics themselves can only be used to spot trends in organizational
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processes, which is not to be confused with quality itself. It is the role of those
observing these trends to arrive at some determination of whether performance is
improving, diminishing, staying the same, or indeterminant. Occasionally there are
unique circumstances in the data that may skew results, and therefore this must be
considered before making inferences of performance or changes in strategy.
Second, KPI schemes are not necessarily transferable from one organization to
another and instead must be designed to fit the unique characteristics of the firm.
According to Caplice and Sheffi (1995, pp. 62):
"Product characteristics, management focus, marketing channels, the competitive
situation, and other factors create a unique logistical environment for each company
which requires a customized performance measurement system."
Thus, due to the unique circumstances that define each organization and its
processes, KPI schemes must be developed internally and occasionally reevaluated
with respect to modifications in functional and corporate strategy.
Third, performance measurement systems can incentivize adverse changes in be-
havior. For one, Meyer (2005) notes that performance indicators are subject to gam-
ing, a situation in which the organization improves its ability to score high marks
on its metrics without necessarily improving in quality.1 Further, with respect to
performance indicators in the health services sector, Davies and Lampel (1998) ex-
press concern that performance measurement may pervert organizational behavior
'It should be noted that Meyer (2005) takes an unusually pessimistic perspective on the use of
performance measurement systems. The author argues that the definition of "performance" and
any inferences that can be drawn from it cannot be addressed by traditional methods because they
focus on past accomplishments and actions and are frequently subject to gaming. In his own words:
"Once a measure is identified as the driver of profitability or of any other desired long-term outcome
and is rewarded, the measure will be gamed to the point whereby it ceases to contain information
about the performance that is ultimately sought" (Meyer, 2005, pp. 289). Though his argument is
a stretch, gaming the system should be a concern to those developing KPIs.
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by promoting an adversarial and defensive culture-in their opinion, quality can only
improve if employees trust that data and indicators are used in a way to enhance
knowledge, rather than as a means to pass judgment.
Finally, KPI systems can be misinterpreted by those involved in decision making.
As previously noted, indicators can only be used to spot trends, whereas performance
itself must then be judged by human actors, who are of course fallible. Therefore,
KPIs and KPI systems should not be regarded as a "silver-bullet" to improve or-
ganizational quality; instead, they must be accompanied by a real understanding of
the organization's strategy and commitment to improving processes.
3.2 Organizational history, strategy, and founda-
tional information
3.2.1 History and general information
Who is Heart to Heart International?
HHI was founded in 1992 by Dr. Gary Morsch, a family physician from Olathe,
Kansas (Morsch and Nelson, 1997). Dr. Morsch did not set out to build an interna-
tional relief organization, but rather wanted to use his skills as a medical professional
to help people in need. After traveling to the Chernobyl region of Russion to explore
the potential for a project to help children affected by the nuclear disaster, he found
the country's health-care system in ruins and started a collection drive to provide
medicine and medical supplies to Moscow. Major pharmaceutical companies soon
donated to the cause, as well as the United States government who offered a C-5A
Galaxy aircraft to transport the cargo. The resulting airlift-from the heart of the
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United States to the heart of Russia-inspired Dr. Morsch to begin an organization
whose purpose was to create healthier communities.
Today, HHI focuses on broadening access to healthcare services in the United
States and abroad. In their words:
"Our mission is to improve global health through initiatives that connect people
and resources to a world in need. Through our mobilization efforts, we provide medical
education, deliver medical aid, respond to people in crisis and address community-
health concerns around the globe." 2
Where do they operate?
HHI supports ongoing health initiatives in nearly 60 countries including the United
States. According to their most recent annual report, HHI's largest recipients of
aid in 2010 in terms of total value were: (1) Haiti with US$20.2m, (2) Guatemala
with US$10.1m, (3) El Salvador with US$8.1m, (4) Mexico with US$5.9m, and (5)
the Dominican Republic with US$4.9m (Heart to Heart International, 2010, pp. 4).
In Haiti, by far their largest humanitarian response program today, HHI served an
estimated 68 thousand patients and contributed over 45 thousand volunteer-hours
to local projects in 2010 (Heart to Heart International, 2010, pp. 5).
How large are they?
HHI has consistently been one of the largest 25 international relief and development
organizations operating in the United States since 1994.3 In their 2011 calendar
year, HHI brought in nearly US$89 million in total revenue according to IRS Form
2See http://www.hearttoheart.org/mission (accessed 23 January 2013).3 Public data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) provides evidence for
this claim. The NCCS serves as the national repository of information for the nonprofit sector in
the United States, deriving its data from IRS Form 990 filings.
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990 filings, US$88 million of which came directly from contributions and grants.4
That same year, HHI distributed US$89 million in donations to programs through
its relief networks, or partners. An important note regarding HHI operations and
performance measurement is that the vast majority of these donations are gifts-in-
kind (GIK), including medical pharmaceuticals and supplies from corporate donors,
as opposed to cash.
Who are their primary donors?
HHI's donors include large companies, local businesses, foundations, civic organiza-
tions, schools, universities, faith communities, and individuals. The majority of their
donations come from the private sector, including major pharmaceutical and medical
supply companies who provide contributions in GIK form. For instance, their largest
donors- include Teva, Mylan, Sanofi, Welch-Allyn, Becton Dickinson, and Johnson
and Johnson. They also receive a significant amount of charitable budget for shipping
activities (freight, air, and ocean) from FedEx. HHI receives a marginal proportion
of funding from the US government; per IRS Form 990 filings, HHI received $145,000
in government grants in 2011, less than 0.2% of their total revenue for that year.
What products do they offer beneficiaries and how?
HHI offers products through their Custom Order Catalog which provides a complete
list of all items the organization has in stock, their expiration dates, and the number
of units, pounds, and cubic feet per case of product. The catalog is updated and
emailed to approved partners every two weeks, and orders themselves arrive from
partners through email. HHI also distributes Care Kits and Ready Relief Boxes,
4Other sources of revenue for non-profit organizations include program service revenue, invest-
ment income, and sale of inventory, amongst others.
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which are pre-packaged kits of hygiene items, medicines, and medical supplies.
Heart To Heart International Offer Quote # CATALOG-INTL Heart To Heart Catalog
Print Date: 13-Nov-202
Please write the name of your organization here:
IRem Brand Name Expiratioa Unite/Cae Lbs/Cm Cic Feet/Cam Requested
Geenrk Name Date Cases
WA-9!4 c.WTLDIEVNYJ1BO4JTbML N/A 1 1.4 0.1
WA-99852 R 1tEME BPcUFF-VNYL-HD-DBLTUlE-DREADED N/A 1 2.1 0.2
C09Q0MNWASE
TRIILINE DISPOSABLE BP CUFF
OWCASE
WA-995 CUFFTLDIIVSMADULTTUHESC N/A 1 3.0 0.2
CFFTDU1V5YLSADUI721JBESC
OOUASE)
WA-995 TYRIMiMD3 OSAB BPC.fL V0I-ADUI-DEILTl-REAED N/A 1 4.0 0.8
ONNBC701SCASE
TRDaLNE DISPOSABLE BP CUFF
WA-998i9 C1FTLDIVINYIADULTTUBE.HP N/A 1 3.6 0.5
CUF7DVRMYADD.STUKM.N
WA-9970 cfFTLDMIPVOINH,ADTIDNuI nEP N/A 1 4.6 0.6
cFTLDIPVmi,AIErLI,1TUEP
WA-9987P c.FTLISPVNLADUITI TM1,3P N/A 1 5.2 0.9
C1PFTLJ)VffYLA~aDW11UNRP7
WA-9?3 CFTLDIWV.,AU1rOO TUE,IL N/A 1 1.8 0.2
WA-99B UMM DItEFAELE PF-0WrADMLT-IDLTUE- BBA11WLE& N/A 1 12.a 07
TRIMLINE DISPOSABLE BP CUFF
Figure 3-2: Snapshot of HHI's Custom Order Catalog
3.2.2 Corporate strategy
How do they acquire donations?
HHI takes a multi-channel approach to fundraising, using corporate and individual
donor relations, direct marketing, online giving, grant writing, special events, com-
munity events, tradeshows, speaking engagements and media relations as means to
acquire donations. The overwhelming majority of products they receive are donated
to them, whereas the actual purchasing of products makes up a negligle percentage
of HHI's receipts.
59
What are their strategic objectives?
HH1 identified four over-arching goals for their 2012 Strategic Plan concerning their
identity and positioning, available resources, disaster response capabilities, and mo-
bilization efforts. From these main objectives, HHI identified specific outcomes of
interest that would demonstrate an improvement in performance given their overall
strategy. The following desired outcomes are of particular note:
e Increase visibility and recognition
e Provide sufficient funds to cover program activities
o Provide effective and efficient response and use of resources
o Increase in volunteers, rentention, and satisfaction
o Increase qualitative and quantitative feedback from recipient partners
e Increase number of recipient partners
o Increase donors, giving, and improved donor retention
What are their organizational strengths? Weaknesses?
Because the majority of their donations are GIK, HHI has been able to transfer an
extremely high percentage of total revenue to programmatic expenses-historically,
95 to 98% of HHI's revenue goes directly to programs. This function of their business
should be viewed as their main strength. Regarding their weaknesses, HHI faces
difficulty in maintaining a steady, predictable flow of donations and forecasting future
demand for their products. Of course, this is a difficulty that many humanitarian
NGOs and non-profits in general face. Additionally, like most humanitarian NGOs,
HHI has difficulty assessing the impact of their deliveries. This is driven by a low
reporting response rate by partners delivering their products in the field.
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3.2.3 Logistics and supply chain operations
What are the inputs, processes, and outputs of their supply chain?
Donors send contributions to HHI's Global Distribution Center (GDC) in Kansas
City, Kansas, where they are stocked and entered into the organization's inventory.5
HHI then advertises it's inventory with their biweekly Custom Order Catalog, which
describes what products are available. Ordering organizations, called "partners,"
then place orders via email, which is entered into HHI's inventory system. After
entering, HHI will follow up with the partner, usually with a phone call, to verify
the order or explain that a requested item is no longer available. Once the order is
verified, it is released to the warehouse for picking. The order is considered picked
once all inventory for the order has been pulled off the shelf, packed into boxes,
and scanned. Finally, the order is considered shipped to the recipient when it exits
HHI's warehouse. Rarely does HHI deliver directly to beneficiaries, Haiti being a
notable exception; instead, the vast majority of orders go to other organizations,
such as churches or other humanitarian NGOs, who then deliver the product to
beneficiaries. Additionally, HHI does not internally track the arrival date of orders
to partners.
What logistics and supply chain data is collected by HHI?
HHI uses inventory management software to track inbound receipts and outbound
orders, and to capture "inventory snapshots" that provide information on all line
items available in their warehouse in Kansas. Though HHI also holds storage space
in Haiti, their main inventory system does not track this data. Additionally, HHI
5HHI also maintains a storage depot facility in Haiti that does not monitor inventory through a
formal system.
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requests field reports from partners delivering its products to beneficiaries in the field
to gain a better sense of the impact of their services; however, only 25% of partners
return these reports and there is no way to assess their accuracy.
Table 3.1: Fields for HHI's inbound, outbound, and inventory database
Inbound receipts Outbound orders Inventory snapshot
Receipt number
Vendor / donor
SKU IDa
Brand / generic name
Category
Total weight / value
Receive / stock date
Expiration date
Pallett number
Order number
Partner ID
SKU ID
Brand / generic name
Category
Total volume / weight / value
Enter / release / pick / ship date
Ship method / carrier
Project code / final desination
Receipt number (when received)
Vendor / donor (when received)
SKU ID
Brand / generic name
Category
Total volume / weight / value
Receive / expiration date
Location in warehouse
Assembly number (if in kit)
a SKU is short for "stock-keeping unit," a code used to identify each unique product or item
available in inventory
What other firms are involved in their supply chain?
Besides its major donors and partners, FedEx provides logistics and supply chain
services for HHI. FedEx also contributes monetary donations for HHI crisis response
activities, as well as budget in shipping activities not restricted to crisis response.
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Do they forecast demand? Is it steady-state? Cyclical? Predictable?
HHI finds it difficult, like many humanitarian organizations, to forecast demand and
supply. Demand for HHI's products is primarily signaled through communication
with partners and established through on-going relationships. Supply, on the other
hand, is unpredictable due to the irregularity of donations. Neither demand nor
supply is steady, seasonal, or cyclical.
3.2.4 Existing performance measurement schemes
How do they currently define performance?
When currently evaluating performance, HHI looks at a number of values from its
inbound receipts, outbound orders, and inventory. From inbound data, HHI considers
how many donors are supplying them product, the total number of receipts, SKUs,
and line items they receive, dock-to-stock time, and total weight of inbound product.
Outbound, they consider the number of recipients, orders, SKUs, and line items, the
number of countries where their products will arrive, the total volume and weight of
outbound product, and time between entry to release, release to pick, and pick to
ship. HHI also monitors how full their warehouse is on a regular basis.
Who is made aware of their performance assessments?
There are two meetings where logistics performance is discussed within HHI. First,
Leadership Team meetings occur at least monthly and incorporate the finance, re-
source development (i.e., fundraising), marketing and communications, and logistics
departments, as well as the programs director, CEO, and other senior management.
The Haiti executive director will also attend this meeting when available, and the
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monitoring and evaluation department may be present. Second, Logistics Staff meet-
ings occur once a month and include everyone from the logistics department. Outside
of these meetings, performance assessments are reported monthly in the organiza-
tion's operations report which is shared with all HHI staff and the Board of Directors.
3.3 Bottom-up analysis of logistics and supply chain
operations
HHI provided complete inbound and outbound logistics data from 2010 through 2012
for this study. HHI also provided a number of inventory snapshots that would serve
as references points to establish their inventory level over time, as well as information
on their warehouse including volume and rack locations. This formed the foundation
for the following inbound receipt, outbound order, and inventory analysis.
Logistics operations for HHI essentially break down into three broad levels of
activities-inbound donation processing, inventory management, and outbound or-
der processing-as seen in Figure 3-3. First, donors (also known as vendors) will
send donated products to HHI, who will visual inspect each receipt for defects, as-
sign each item a unique license number, and rack them in inventory. These products
are then kept in HHI's warehouse and advertised to the broader humanitarian com-
munity, who will place orders. Once an order is submitted, HHI will gather the items
required for that order, palletize those items, and ship the order to the partner.
In performing the bottom-up analysis, the data fields identified in Table 3.1 are
observed with respect to time and other factors in order to spot trends and non-trends
in HHI's logistics and operational functions.6 Identifying trends is important for two
6Notably, non-trends can be just as important as trends, particularly when the organization
would rather a non-trend be a trend.
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Figure 3-3: Essential HHI logistics and supply chain operations
main reasons. First, they can serve as an indication of the organization's strengths
and weaknesses, as well as whether its strategy is leading to measurable success. For
instance, if the organization cites the acquisition and retention of donors as a goal,
then it would be prudent to track the number of unique donors to the organization on
a per month basis over the last few years. Additionally, the existence of both trends
and non-trends can be relayed to leadership and others within the organization who
can comment on their importance to the firm's strategy.
Notably, it can be problematic to draw conclusions regarding the statistical signif-
icance of trends through individual time series; thus, statistical significance of trends
is not discussed in this section. Rather, trends in variables are merely categorized
into one of seven domains by observing the ratio of (1) the slope of the linear least
squares regression line through each variable over one years time, to (2) the average
value of the variable over all available data.7' 8 This ratio provides a quick and dirty
means to assess the degree to which the data is linearly trending, either positively or
negatively. For example, if a ratio of 0.10 is observed for a particular variable, then
one can say that, over a years time, the linear least squares regression line through
7The average value of the variable is used as a means to normalize the data so that comparisons
can be made across different types of variables.
8jt is also important to note here that in no way does this analysis imply that any of the
time series observed in this section vary distinctly linearly with respect to time. Instead, a linear
trend is used-as opposed to exponential, logarithmic, etc.-to model the severity of how much the
variable's average has increased over time.
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the data will have approximately increased 10% of that variable's average. The trend
classification scheme is presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Categorization of trends
Trend SlopeMean Notation
Strongly increasing
Moderately increasing
Marginally increasing
No trend
Marginally decreasing
Moderately decreasing
Strongly decreasing
> 0.10
[0.050,0.099]
[0.025, 0.049]
0.0249,0.0249
0.049, -0.025]
- 0.099, -0.050
< -0.10
Minimum, maximum, mean, median, standard deviation, and upper and lower
quartiles are also identified for each observed value. Due to space constraints, not
all variables and trends are discussed at length in this section. It is also important
to note that occasionally data points are excluded from trend calculations if they
are believed to overly-skew results. Therefore, when data is excluded it is identified
as such in the notes of the appropriate summary table. Finally, certain values and
donor names are hidden to address anonymity concerns where appropriate.
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3.3.1 Inbound donation processing
Weight and value
A strongly increasing trend is identified for total weight in pounds of inbound product
per month, whereas total value of inbound product received each month by HHI is
experiencing a marginally increasing trend. Increasing trends for weight and value
are desired, as this indicates the organization is receiving more donations.
Line items, SKUs, and receipts
A line item refers to a single detailed record of a particular item, whereas a receipt
refers to a single received shipment, consisting of at least one, and perhaps thousands,
of line items. For example, if a warehouse receives three bottles of 200 milligram
tablets of Ibuprofen with 1,000 tablets per bottle, ten stethoscopes, and a package of
five 0.5 milliliter syringes in a shipment, this single receipt will carry three separate
line items. Additionally, a stock-keeping unit (SKU) refers to a unique code used
to identify each product or item within a receipt, order, or in inventory. Therefore,
the receipt from the previous hypothetical will also have three unique SKUs. In
addition, every bottle of 200 milligram Ibuprofen tablets with 1,000 tablets per bottle,
regardless of whether it has arrived in a receipt, is on order, or is in inventory, will
(hopefully) share the same SKU code. A moderately increasing trend is observed
for HHI's inbound line items with respect to time, while no trends are observed for
either SKUs or receipts. This indicates that the firm's management complexity and
overhead is relatively under control.
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Dock-to-stock time
Dock-to-stock (DTS) time refers to the time it takes in days to stock an item onto
the warehouse shelf. The average DTS time of all line items is observed to be
strongly decreasing. However, this result is skewed by a spike in DTS times during
the middle of 2011, as seen in Fig 3-4; throughout 2012, DTS times for HHI have
remained relatively flat. A decreasing trend in DTS times indicates an improvement
in warehouse performance, although stable DTS times may be positive if they are at
a place where the organization is content.
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Figure 3-4: Average DTS time of line items, per month, 2011-2012
Additionally, HHI was interested in whether the number of line items in, the
total weight of, or the total value of a receipt had an impact on its DTS time. In
Figure 3-5 we observe each unique receipt, its count of line items, its total weight in
pounds, and its value in dollars. Only no trend to marginally increasing trends are
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observed here, suggesting that neither the count of line items, weight, or value has a
significant impact on the DTS time of the receipt.
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Figure 3-5: Impact of line items, weight, and value on DTS time, 2011-2012
Donors
The count of unique donors of product to HHI is also observed on a per month basis;
however, no trend is observed. This suggests that the number of donors to HHI is
not growing nor shrinking from year to year. This is not necessarily a positive or
negative indicator of performance-rather, that is an opinion of the organization's
leadership.
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Analysis of line items, weight, value, and DTS time, per individual receipt
A number of calculations were also made on a per receipt basis to gain a sense for
how HHI's receipt composition has changed with respect to time. The average count
of line items per receipt was found to have a strongly decreasing trend; that is, the
number of line items per receipt is likely decreasing over time. The average value
of receipt was found to have a strongly increasing trend, suggesting that receipts
are becoming more valuable in monetary terms over time. In general, receipts with
greater value and less items (i.e., less complexity) should be viewed as a positive
trend. Finally, in Figure 3-6, the average DTS time for receipts per month was
found to have a strongly decreasing trend, while the average weight of receipts per
month is classified as having a moderately increasing trend.
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Figure 3-6: Average DTS time per receipt, per month, 2010-2012
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December 2010 April 2011
Table 3.3: Inbound receipt analysis, 2010-2012
Min Max Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile
Slope
Mean Trend
Line itemsa 196 1,326 554.4 533 251.6 709.0 365.5 7.4% + +
SKUsa 127 548 336.8 341 117.6 441.0 232.0 -0.6%
Receiptsa 22 60 37.3 34 11.2 47.5 28.0 2.3% =
po nds]weight [k- 21.9 168.2 68.0 59.3 34.2 84.8 40.4 17.1% + + +
Total value [US$k]ac 330.4 20,963.8 5,718.2 3,402.3 5,597.3 7,970.3 1,769.7 4.9% +
Avg. DTS [days]d 2.4 29.0 9.5 7.6 6.8 11.6 5.2 -48.9% - - -
Donorsa 10 24 14.2 14 3.2 15.5 12.0 0.9% =
Jan through Mar 2010 excluded due to abnormalities in inbound receipts in response to Haitian earthquake
Nov 2012 excluded due to abnormally heavy shipments of hygiene supplies from Johnson and Johnson
Aug and Nov 2012 excluded due to abnormally valuable shipments of pharmaceuticals from Mylan and Teva
Jan through Dec 2010 excluded due to lack of data; 3 negative and 1 abnormal receipts excluded
Jan 2010, Feb 2011, and Apr 2011 excluded due to abnormalities in receipt values of pharmaceuticals from Mylan and Teva
Field
a
b
C
d
e
Table 3.4: Per receipt calculations of inbound receipt analysis, 2010-2012
Field Min Max Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile
Slope
Mean Trend
Avg. line items per 7.5 25.0 15.2 15.0 5.1 20.0 10.8 -11.0% - - -
receipt
Avg. weight per re- 768.7 9,144.8 2,311.4 1,905.0 1,611.7 2,804.5 1,266.6 9.7% + +
ceipt [pounds]
Avg. value per re- 12.2 580.9 154.7 100.1 156.3 196.9 53.4 39.3% + + +
ceipt [US$k]a
Avg. DTS time per 2.6 21.1 8.7 7.1 4.9 11.0 5.2 -33.7% --
receipt [days]
a Jan 2010, Feb 2011, and Apr 2011 excluded due to abnormalities in receipt values of pharmaceuticals from Mylan and Teva
3.3.2 Inventory management
HHI's inbound receipts are processed by the organization's warehouse team at their
Global Distribution Center (GDC) in Kansas City, Kansas. Line items within each
receipt are stocked in the GDC, labeled with a numeric license plate code, and entered
into the inventory database. Once an item is entered in the database, it is advertised
on HHI's Custom Order Catalog as being available for order. When an item is picked
and shipped for an outbound order it is removed from the database.
The inventory management system used by HHI does not automatically capture
and record the amount of inventory available in the GDC. However, semi-regular
inventory "snapshots" were taken during the middle months of 2012 that provide
information on what line items and their unit count are in the organization's in-
ventory at specific points in time. Therefore, to determine HHI's inventory as a
function of time, the total number of available units observed in a single inventory
snapshot serves as a baseline, and the predicted units of inventory for previous and
future months are calculated by considering the count of inbound and outbound units
in other months. For example, to forecast available units for the month following
the baseline, the number of inbound units that arrived during the baseline month
are added to the baseline, while the number of outbound units that departed are
subtracted.9
9Notably, there is some observed error when the predicted count of units is compared to the
actual count of units observed in a snapshot. According to Dan Neal, the Director of Global
Logistics at HHI, this is partly due to assembly procedures. When HHI Care Kits and Ready Relief
Boxes are assembled, these items are treated as a single unit even though they were comprised of
multiple separate units. This will result in fewer predicted units than what is actually available
for months beyond the baseline, and more predicted units for months prior to the baseline. For
instance, using June 2012 as a baseline, there is an 8.2% observed difference between predicted and
actual counts of inventory in January 2013. While this error is not significant to the point that the
results of this inventory analysis should be ignored, it is still important to consider..
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Units in inventory
The number of units in a line item refers to the specific count of items that exist
within that line item. In our previous example of a shipment of three bottles of 200
milligram tablets of Ibuprofen, ten stethoscopes, and a package of five syringes, this
shipment contains 18 units in total. The unit count of inventory is useful in that it
allows for comparisons with respect to inbound receipts and outbound orders.
Figure 3-7 shows the count of available units located in HHI's GDC warehouse
as a function of time between January 2010 and January 2013. Clearly, there is a
significant spike in inventory in February 2011, which corresponds to an unusually
large receipt of over 14 million medical swabs. 10 Excluding this receipt and the
subsequent months where this inventory lingered, HHI on average holds between 1
and 4 million total units in inventory.
It is also interesting to observe HHI's inventory over the last year of available
data, as seen in Figure 3-8. Here, we observe a strongly increasing trend in the
number of units available in inventory. It is difficult to say definitively what this
means for the organization without simultaneously observing inbound receipts and
outbound orders over this same time period. For instance, an increase in inventory
could correspond to a decrease in units ordered; however, it could also correspond to
a strong influx of received donations.
Inbound and outbound units
As mentioned above, it also important to consider inbound and outbound units
with respect to inventory levels. Figure 3-9 below shows the count of inbound and
10This points to one main limitation of observing inventory as a function of unit counts. A
medical swab received by HHI consists of a relatively insignificant amount of value compared to
pharmaceuticals or medical devices, yet each item is of equal standing when observing unit counts.
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Figure 3-7: Units available in inventory, January 2010-January 2013
outbound units per month since January 2012 through January 2013. Again, a
spike appears in inbound units corresponding to the large receipt of medical swabs.
Interestingly, in the six or so months following this receipt, HHI was able to scale up
its delivery of units, which is why its inventory dropped to normal levels by 2012.
Figure 3-10 shows the count of inbound and outbound units each month between
January 2012 and January 2013. Here we see strongly increasing trends for both
inbound units and outbound units. However, the count of inbound units is generally
higher than outbound, which explains why HHI's inventory grew rapidly in 2012.
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Figure 3-8: Units available in inventory, January 2012-January 2013
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Figure 3-9: Inbound and outbound units, January 2010-January 2013
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Figure 3-10: Inbound and outbound units, January 2012-January 2013
Inventory turns and days of inventory
Inventory turns is a measure of the number of times inventory is sold or used within
a certain time period, usually given as a year. For instance, an inventory turn of
12 means that the organization sold or used its inventory 12 times per year (once a
month), whereas an inventory of turn of 1 means that the organization sold or used
its inventory only once over that year. A low turnover rate may indicate overstocking
which unnecessarily drives up inventory holding costs for the organization, while a
high turnover rate may indicate that the organization suffers from stock shortages.
There are a number of ways to calculate inventory turns; for example, it is occa-
sionally defined as the ratio between the cost of goods sold and average inventory on
hand. In this case, inventory turns are calculated as the ratio between the number
of units sold and the average number of units in inventory over the last year.
Number of units sold over a year
Inventory turns =
Average number of units in inventory
From Figure 3-11, a strongly increasing trend is observed for HHI inventory turns,
though over the last quarter of 2012 this may be leveling off between three and five
turns per year. While it is important to note that the appropriate number of turns
is dependent on the sector and the organization in question, for-profit companies
typically aim for an inventory turn ratio between six and 12. For a humanitarian
organization like HHI which relies on "pushing" its available inventory to partners,
a ratio between three and six is perfectly reasonable.
Additionally, the number of days in inventory is observed for HHI. This is simply
given as the number of days per year over the inventory turn ratio, and corresponds
to the average number of days the organization holds its inventory before using
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it. Since inventory turns and days in inventory are inversely proportional, it is no
surprise that days in inventory is experiencing a strongly decreasing trend. Towards
the later quarter of 2012, HHI is ordering off its inventory every 100 days.
365 days
Days in inventory =
Inventory turns
Warehouse capacity
Data was also provided on the warehouse capacity used per month between Au-
gust 2011 and December 2012. Warehouse usage is calculated as the percentage of
warehouse racks occupied by at least one unit of inventory. The trend in warehouse
capacity utilized is marginally decreasing, and is roughly 70% on average.
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Figure 3-11: Inventory turns, December 2010-January 2013
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Table 3.5: Inventory analysis, 2010-2012
Field Min Max Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile
Slope
Mean Trend
Units in inventory 789.1 2,980.8 1,765.8 1,582.7 628.4 2,407.1 1,415.9 94.9% + + +[thousands]a
Inbound units 103.0 1,676.9 622.3 398.7 515.7 1,124.2 208.9 82.4% + + +[thousands]a
Outbound units 166.8 1,091.8 496.1 451.9 263.3 674.5 290.5 92.6% + + +[thousandsa
Inventory turnsb 0.95 5.16 2.58 2.38 1.21 3.58 1.46 67.5% + + +
Days in inventory 70.8 382.7 178.6 153.7 90.2 250.8 101.9 -72.4% - - -
[days]b
Warehouse capac- 57.0% 78.0% 68.9% 68.0% 6.6% 76.5% 64.5% -4.1% -
ity used'
a Data analysis includes only
b Data analysis includes only
C Data analysis includes only
January 2012 through January 2013
December 2010 through January 2013
August 2011 through December 2012
00
3.3.3 Outbound order processing
Volume, weight, and value
The total volume of HHI's outbound product, per month, is observed as having no
trend, while the total weight of product is experiencing a marginally decreasing trend.
Total value of outbound product per month is found to be moderately increasing.
Line items, SKUs, and orders
The count of line items leaving HHI on a per month basis is found to have a moder-
ately increasing trend, whereas the count of unique orders per month is observed as
having a marginally decreasing trend. The count of outbound SKUs per month, how-
ever, is experiencing a strongly increasing trend-that is, HHI is likely distributing
an increasing number of unique items per month.
Entry, release, pick, and ship dates
The count of days between when an order is entered, released, picked, and shipped
is considered. Ideally, the time between each event will decrease over time, as this
indicates that the warehouse staff is doing a better job processing orders. The av-
erage count of days from entry to release, and from pick to ship are found to have
strongly decreasing trends; however, the average count of days from release to pick
is experiencing a moderately increasing trend. Overall, the average count of days
between order entry and shipment is found to have a moderately decreasing trend.
Figure 3-12 illustrates the proportion of time taken up by each specific warehouse
process. On average, entry to release and pick to ship processes each take up 45% of
the total entry to ship time, whereas release to pick takes up approximately 10%.
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Figure 3-12: Avg. days between warehouse events, per month, 2010-2012
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Partners
A partner refers to whoever places an order for product through HHI. The count of
unique partners placing orders with HHI, per month, is found to have no trend.
Projects
A project refers to a specific program into which HHI categorizes orders-for instance,
"HAITI-EARTHQUAKE," "JOPLIN-TORNADO," and "CUSTOM ORDER." The
count of specific projects identified by HHI, per month, is experiencing no trend.
Destination countries
The destination country of an order refers to the final location where that order will
be delivered. The count of unique destination countries that HHI is providing orders
for is found to have a moderately increasing trend, suggesting that HHI is sending
product to more countries.
Additionally, Figures 3-13 and 3-14 illustrate the total weight of product shipped
and the average time it takes to process a line item from entry to ship for each
destination country between 2010 and 2012.1 It is important to note here that the
times referred to in this section do not include the time it takes the order to transit
to its final location. For instance, orders to Japan were entered and subsequently
shipped within a single day, on average; however, they most certainly did not arrive
in Japan on that same day.
"Since processing times outlined here are calculated as averages, those with a small number of
records may be skewed. For example, while 437 unique orders to Haiti were processed between 2010
and 2012, there were only three orders to Yemen that were processed, one of which took 288 days.
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Figure 3-14: Average entry to ship time of select countries, 2010-2012
Obsolete inventory
HHI was also interested in the inventory it was disposing of due to obsoletion or
expiration. Similar to the analysis performed in the inventory management section,
the number of obsolete inventory turns is observed on a per month basis.
Number of obsolete units disposed of over a year
Obsolete inventory turns =
Average number of units in inventory
There were a large proportion of null records in this dataset-in fact, HHI only
disposed of product in 7 out of 36 months of available data. From Figure 3-15 below,
HHI's obsolete inventory turnover rate is experiencing a strongly increasing trend;
however, it dropped dramatically in December of 2012. Additionally, this rate has
routinely existed below 5% of total inventory, which is a decent target for a firm that
pushes pharmaceutical and medical devices, many of which have a shelf-life.
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Figure 3-15: Obsolete inventory, by volume and weight, per month, 2010-2012
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Analysis of line items, volume, weight, and value, per individual order
To gain an understanding of the changes in HHI's order composition, the count of
line items, volume, weight, and value of product is observed per individual order.
The average count of line items and value per order, per month, are found to have
strongly increasing trends-that is, the number of line items within an order and the
value of orders themselves are increasing over time. The first of these two trends can
be seen in Figure 3-16, which indicates that HHI's outbound order composition is
getting more complex over time. The average volume and weight of individual orders
are both found to be experiencing moderately increasing trends.
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Figure 3-16: Average outbound line items per order, per month, 2010-2012
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Table 3.6: Outbound order analysis, 2010-2012
Field
Line items
SKUs
Min
658
156
Max
2,275
746
Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile
1,535
495.4
1,543
482
432.5
132.3
1,866.8
609.3
1,241.8
413.3
Slope
Mean
5.4%
13.8%
Trend
+ +
Orders 39o 1.6 72 18.u 88.u 57.5 -2.6% -
Volume [k-cubic 1.2 15.4 7.7 7.3 3.0 9.4 5.8 -1.4% =
feet]
Weight [k-pounds] 15.7 156.6 81.5 73.9 32.7 107.8 53.9 -4.7% -
Value [US$k] 426.5 21,157.7 7,242.7 5,537.6 5,410.0 9,289.8 3,684.8 9.2% + +
Partners 24 67 41.0 40 10.7 46.5 33.3 0.6% =
Projectsa 5 9 6.6 6 1.1 7.8 6.0 -2.4% =
Destination
countriesb 8 24 15.5 15 3.7 18.0 12.3 8.9% ± ±
a Excludes any projects that concern obsolete product
b Excludes countries designated "DESTRUCTION" for removal of obsolete product
0o
Table 3.7: Outbound order events analysis, 2010-2012
Min Max Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile M"an Trend
Avg. entry to release 2.9 24.5 10.0 8.1 5.6 13.8 5.8 -11.2% ---
time [days]a
Avg. release to pick 0.6 4.1 2.2 2.3 0.8 2.6 1.4 6.8% + +
time [days]a,b
Avg. pick to ship time 4.4 30.4 9.9 8.2 5.5 10.7 6.4 -10.0% ---
[days]a,c
Avg. entry to ship 10.0 38.6 22.2 20.6 8.0 27.3 15.4 -9.0 - -
time [days]a
Field
0o
a "DESTRUCTION" country code excluded
b One abnormal order from July 2011 to Nigeria of medical supplies excluded
c One abnormal order from November 2010 to Haiti of pharmaceuticals and medical supplies excluded
Table 3.8: Other calculations for outbound order analysis, 2010-2012
Min Max Mean Median StDev Upper LowerQuartile Quartile Mean Trend
Obsolete inventory 0.002 0.054 0.018 0.013 0.014 0.024 0.008 64.7% + + +turns [% total units]'
Avg.rb line items per 12.8 36.4 21.4 20.0 4.9 24.5 17.8 10.1% + + +
orderb
Avg. volume per order 31.2 354.5 115.9 109.8 58.9 147.6 72.7 8.6% + +[cubic feet
Avg. weight per order 338.6 3,579.0 1,233.0 1,151.5 616.2 1399.9 878.6 7.9% + +[pounds]b
USkvalue per order 10.9 244.5 98.2 78.1 66.8 135.1 49.4 13.1% + + +
a Data analysis includes only December 2010 through December 2012
b A single order by the US Department of State from September 2012
abnormal volume, weight, and value
to Moldova of pharmaceuticals is excluded due to its
Field
3.3.4 Insights from bottom-up approach
Individual KPIs identified using the bottom-up approach are produced in Table 3.9,
and were selected after discussing observations from the bottom-up approach with
HHI logistics staff. This approach stressed the importance of standard warehousing
metrics as a means to benchmark logistics activity. These include, for instance, dock-
to-stock (DTS) time, warehouse order cycle time (WOCT), and warehouse usage.
Further, given that HHI deals with pharmaceuticals and medical devices that often
have a shelf life, tracking the turnover of obsolete inventory is also important.
It was also observed from this approach that HHI relies on a small number of
large donors to supply the majority of their inbound product. Thus, it would be
useful for the organization to track the percentage of total inbound value that is
received from this small handful of donors. A high concentration of donations from a
small number of organizations is not necessarily a negative outcome, though it may
point to issues of reliance and lead to product shortages or stock-outs.
3.4 Top-down analysis of organizational strategy
The top-down approach to developing KPIs considers the objectives of the organi-
zation and what desired outcomes are representative of that strategy being fulfilled.
Of course, this is a largely subjective process, and one that is dependent on the
beliefs of individuals within the organization itself. Thus, a survey was distributed
to full-time staffers and board members of HHI to help provide an understanding for
the thoughts of these individuals in regards to the organization's goals. Additionally,
some insights were drawn from direct conversations with HHI personnel.
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Table 3.9: Logistics KPIs identified by bottom-up approach
KPI Logistics activity Equation
Dock-to-stock (DTS) time Donation processing Avg. DTS time per receipt Yes
Donor concentration ratio D Value from largest donors
(DCR) Donation processing Total inbound value
Inventory turns (IT) Inventory management Count of outbound units NoAvg. units of inventory
Warehouse usage ratio (WUR) Inventory management Occupied warehouse area YesTotal warehouse area
Obsolete inventory turns Inventory management Av'"g*.* uto""" in to No(OIT) Avg. units of inventory
Warehouse order cycle time Order processing Avg. time between events per yes
(WOCT)a order
a Warehouse order cycle time should also be split up into
entry to release, release to pick, and pick to ship
three event-to-event cycle times-order
3.4.1 The survey
The survey used in this approach consists of four parts. The first section asked
standard background questions, such as title, department, and engagement with
the logistics department. Next, the respondents were asked of their perceptions
regarding the importance and overall strategy of HHI's logistics department. Third,
respondents were asked what objectives were critical to HHI logistics operations, and
how the organization was fairing in meeting those objectives. Finally, respondents
were asked what outcomes they would like the logistics department to monitor. The
contents of this survey can be viewed in Appendix B.
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Data col-
lected?
3.4.2 Results
Background
Of the 36 HHI staff and board members polled, 24 survey results were received.
Responses came from all departments within the organization, including logistics,
finance, resource development (i.e., fundraising), programs, administration, amongst
others. Approximately 70% of respondents had worked or been affiliated with HHI
for a period of five years or less. About 80% of respondents indicated that they
interact at least weekly with HHI's logistics department.
Logistics perceptions
When asked how important product and GIK distribution is to the success of HHI,
78.3% of respondents described it as a "very important activity" while the remaining
21.7% described it as "the most important activity." When asked how much HHI
should charge partners for GIK distribution, 73.9% of the organization indicated that
HHI should generate "modest" surplus revenue from this activity to invest in other
activities, 21.7% indicated that HHI should generate "significant" surplus revenue,
and the remaining respondent indicated that HHI should cover half its logistics costs.
Respondents were also asked to state, in their own words, what the main objec-
tive of HHI's logistics department should be. Many responses here highlighted the
importance of product and GIK distribution to partners. For example:
"To distribute medical supplies to agencies who need the product and use it effectively."
"Distribute the most product that they can in a manner that is satisfactory and con-
venient to customers."
"To secure and distribute products to partners and to generate revenue for use else-
where."
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"Fulfill the Heart to Heart core mission of providing product to our partners and
projects."
Logistics objectives
Respondents were then asked how critical certain objectives from a list of twelve are
to HHI on a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). Table 3.10 summarizes
those three objectives that ranked highest and those three that ranked lowest.
Table 3.10: Highest and lowest ranking logistics objectives
Rank Objective Score Rank Objective Score
1 Quality and accuracy of or- 4.57 9 Leveraging volunteers for ser- 3.75ders to partners vices
2 Accountability and trans- 4.43 10 Availability of wide array of 3.43parency to donors / partners products to partnersb
3 Quality of available products 4.13a 11 Delivery of aid direct to ben- 2.87
eficiaries
a Good communication between logistics staff and other departments also ranked in at 3, with
a score of 4.13
b "Community involvement" ranked in between 10 and 11 with a score of 3.41, however respon-
dents were confused as to what this exactly meant and thus this result was ignored
Performance measurement
In the fourth section of the survey, respondents were asked what metrics-from a list
of fifteen that the organization is currently capable of measuring-they would like to
see included in the HHI monthly report. Table 3.11 summarizes the five objectives
that ranked highest, and the five that ranked lowest.
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Table 3.11: Highest and lowest ranking performance metrics
Rank Objective Response Rank Objective Response
rate rate
1 Total value of product re 81.8% 11 Warehouse order cycle 31.8%
ceived from donors time (WOCT)bc
2 Total value of product de- 77.3% 12 Quantity of disposed 27.3%livered to partners product due to expiration
3 Quantity of product deliv- 68.2% 13 Dock-to-stock (DTS) time 22.7%
ered to partners
4 Quantity of product re- 63.6% 14 Accuracy of items stocked 22.7%
ceived from donors in warehouse
5 Number of unique part- 54.5% 15 Number of unique pro- 13.6%
ners serviceda grams / projects
a The number of unique destination countries also ranked in at 5, with a 54.5% response rate
b WOCT is the time between when an order is placed and when it is shipped
c The accuracy of orders delivered to partners / beneficiaries also ranked in at 11, with a 31.8%
response rate
Finally, respondents were asked what additional measures of logistics activity
they would like to see included in the monthly report, even if it cannot currently be
calculated by HHI. Some interesting responses included:
"Number of Volunteer Hours specifically for Logistics activities."
"Number of work days supplied by volunteers."
"True demand for categories of products and even better, true demand for specific
products."
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3.4.3 Insights from top-down approach
Individual KPIs identified using the top-down approach are produced in Table 3.12.
This approach indicated that connecting GIK from donors to partners is the primary
mission of the organization. Notably, respondents asked for this to be reflected
through the value of GIK over quantity, and thus the value of inbound and outbound
product will be essential for HHI to track. Further, both the quality of available
products and orders placed to partners ranked high on logistics objectives. It is
therefore important that HHI monitor how accurately orders are being processed by
the logistics staff, in addition to the state of product available in the warehouse.
Two responses from the final question yielded interesting results as well. First,
two respondents indicated that the efforts of volunteers should be included in the
monthly report. This likely speaks to the aspect of HHI that promotes the involve-
ment of the community in helping serve their mission. Second, one respondent was
interested in tracking the "true demand" of products. When orders are placed by
partners, HHI is occasionally unable to supply the total amount demanded to that
partner due to a lack of product. Therefore, it would be a useful practice to observe
how much product demand is actually being satisfied by the organization.
There were also a few interesting items that were less important given the top-
down approach. For one, the direct delivery of aid to beneficiaries ranked last on
logistics objectives, stressing HHI's focus on connecting partners to product, rather
than beneficiaries directly." In addition, some measures that were observed to be
critical in the bottom-up approach seemed less important to respondents, such as
DTS time, warehouse order cycle time (WOCT), and obsolete inventory turnover.
"A notable exception to this rule is HH1 operations in Haiti.
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Table 3.12: Logistics KPIs identified by top-down approach
KPI Logistics activity Equation Data col-lected?
Inbound value (IV) Donation processing Total inbound value Yes
Damaged product ratio Donation processing Damaged inbound receipts No
(DPR) Total inbound receipts
Volunteer hours (VH) Inventory management Volunteer hours per month Yes
Outbound value (OV) Order processing Total outbound value Yes
Total demand satisfied Order processing Value of product satisfied No(TDS) Value of product demanded
Perfect order ratio (POR) Order processing Orders processed without error NoTotal order count
3.5 Proposed logistics KPI system
This section identifies the individual KPIs that were selected for HHI's preliminary
logistics KPI system, evaluates these metrics and the system as a whole with respect
to the criteria defined by Caplice and Sheffi (1994, 1995), and suggests a means to
monitor and present the system.
3.5.1 Individual KPIs
The individual KPIs identified for HHI's logistics performance measurement system
using the bottom-up and top-down approaches are defined here, including the way
in which each metric can be calculated, its usefulness as an indicator, and how it
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should be interpreted by the organization. Further, these KPIs are evaluated on an
individual basis given the criteria identified by Caplice and Sheffi (1994).13 Of note
is that some of the metrics suggested here cannot currently be monitored by HHI
because they do not capture the required data; however, where this is true this thesis
suggests how the data for these metrics can be collected by the organization in the
future. The KPIs themselves are summarized in Tables 3.13 and 3.14.
Donation processing metrics
Dock-to-stock (DTS) time Dock-to-stock (DTS) time refers to the time it takes,
usually measured in days, to stock all line items in a receipt onto the warehouse shelf.
A decreasing trend in DTS times will indicate an improvement in the performance
of warehouse staff, although level DTS times may also be ideal if they are at a point
with which the organization is content.
Since DTS time is a standard warehousing metric used amongst nearly all orga-
nizations where receipt of product is important to operations, it is both a robust and
useful metric. However, because DTS is likely dependent on the total volume of in-
bound receipts and outbound orders, and only concerns inbound ordering processes,
it is neither valid nor integrative.
13 Caplice and Sheffi (1994) cite eight criteria to evaluate performance metrics on an individual ba-
sis. Validity indicates that the metric accurately captures the events and activities being measured
and controls for any exogenous factors. Robustness indicates that the metric is interpreted similarly
by the users, is comparable across time, location, and organizations, and is repeatable. Usefulness
indicates that the metric is readily understandable by the decision maker and provides a guide for
action to be taken. Integration indicates the metric includes all relevant aspects of the process and
promotes coordination across functions and divisions. Economy indicates that the benefits of using
the metric outweight the costs of data collection, analysis, and reporting. Compatability indicates
the metric is compatible with the existing information, material, and cash flows and systems in
the organization. Level of detail indicates the metric provides a sufficient degree of granularity or
aggregation for the user. Finally, behavioral soundness indicates the metric minimizes incentives
for counter-productive acts or game-playing and is presented in a useful form.
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Over the last year, HHI was processing receipts at an average of approximately
seven days, or one week. It is recommended that the organization continue to process
receipts with this speed or better in the future. However, since HHI warehouse staff
is a limited resource, during times where there are a large number of outbound orders
it is reasonable to expect DTS times to suffer.
DTS = Avg. count of days between dock-to-stock, per receipt
Donor concentration ratio (DCR) Through the bottom-up analysis approach
it was observed that the value of product supplied to HHI is concentrated among a
small number of large donors. The donor concentration ratio (DCR) captures as to
what degree the organization relies on donations from these organizations.
DCR is valid in that it accurately captures the proportion of business supplied
by HHI's largest donors, useful in that it signals to decision makers risks of reliance
and potential stock-outs, and behaviorally sound in that it cannot be doctored by
the organization. It is however, not robust nor integrative since it should not be
compared across organizations and only considers donation acquisition processes.
It is recommended that HHI track two forms of the DCR-the first being defined
as the value supplied by the largest four donors over total value donated on a monthly
basis, whereas the second considers the value supplied by the largest eight donors.
Thus, DCR is similar to firm-four and firm-eight concentration metrics that are often
used to characterize markets.
DCR = Value received from largest donors|4,8
Total value received from all donors
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Inbound value (IV) The inbound value (IV) is simply the total value of GIK
supplied to HHI from donors in a given month. Though it is a performance indicator,
it is not provided as a ratio. IV is considered extremely important to the organization
since respondents to the top-down analysis survey placed heavy emphasis on this
quantity. HHI currently broadcasts this metric within the organization, and it is
recommended they continue to do so since product acquisition and distribution is
such a significant portion of their business.
IV is both valid and behaviorally sound since it accurately captures the amount of
product received by the organization and cannot be doctor. However, it is not robust,
useful, and integrative, since it should not be compared across organizations, does
not provide a clear guide for action, and only captures GIK acquisition processes.
Additionally, it lacks level of detail because it does not indicate as to what categories
or from where product is arriving.
IV = Total inbound value received from donors
Damaged product ratio (DPR) In the top-down analysis survey, respondents
placed heavy emphasis on the quality of available products delivered to partners. The
damaged product ratio (DPR) captures the proportion of receipts processed by the
warehouse staff from donors that are damaged. Thus, DPR allows the organization
to understand the quality of their inventory, as well as the quality of products that
are being provided to them by specific donors.
DPR is robust since it can be compared across specific moments in time and
other organizations, and is useful in that it provides decision makers with specific
information on which donors are supplying them deficient receipts. It is not valid
nor integrative, though, because whether or not a receipt is damaged is a subjective
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process, 14 and it only considers product acquisition. Further, DPR is not compatible
because HHI does not capture the required data. It is therefore recommended that
warehouse staff track what receipts are deserving of a "damaged" designation-
notably, it also remains to be seen whether this metric is economic because this data
may prove difficult to collect.
DPR = Count of inbound receipts with damaged 
product
Total count of inbound receipts
Inventory management metrics
Inventory turns (IT) Inventory turns (IT) is a measure of the number of times
inventory is sold or used within a time period, usually a year. A low IT rate may
indicate overstocking which unnecessarily drives up inventory holding costs for the
firm, whereas a high rate may indicate that the organization occasionally suffers from
stock shortages. For HHI, an IT ratio between three and six is reasonable.
IT as a metric is robust and integrative in that it is easily understandable across
organizations and summarizes both inventory management and outbound ordering
processes. However, IT is not valid nor useful in that a variety of factors may explain
changes in IT, and it does not send a clear signal of action.
HHI does not currently capture the data required to calculate IT on a monthly
basis, and therefore it is not currently compatible. It is recommended that HHI
perform monthly inventory snapshots to acquire a consistent idea of organization's
inventory state and allow for this metric to be collected.
IT =Number of units sold over 
a year
Average number of units in inventory
"Many receipts to HHI and other humanitarian organizations are deficient in some way, be-
cause otherwise they would not have been donated. Thus, designating a product as "damaged" is
subjective and potentially rather difficult to do.
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Warehouse usage ratio (WUR) The warehouse usage ratio (WUR) is the aver-
age percentage of warehouse rack locations that are occupied by at least one unit of
inventory. It is therefore not calculated as a percentage of total warehouse volume,
yet it does indicate as to what extent the warehouse area is being utilized.
WUR is valid and useful in that is simple and easily interpreted by decision
makers. It is not robust nor integrative as warehouse operations of different firms are
not necessarily comparable, and it only concerns inventory management processes.
There are two conflicting requirements that must be considered when observing
WUR. First, it is a positive result to have a warehouse that is nearly full, as this will
maximize the number of product choices available to partners. At the same time,
however, the warehouse should not be completely full since this does not allow the
organization to be flexible with inbound receipts.
Number of rack locations utilized
WUR =
Total number of rack locations
Obsolete inventory turns (OIT) The obsolete inventory turnover (OIT) rate
tracks the quantity of inventory HHI is disposing of due to obsolescence or expiration
with respect to total inventory levels. HHI does not currently collect the appropriate
data to capture its OIT and thus this metric is not compatible. However, a monthly
inventory snapshot would be sufficient to calculate this metric in the future.
Like standard inventory turns, OIT is robust and integrative, yet lacks validity
and usefulness. Further, it may also lack behavioral soundness, since expired or
obsolete inventory is not disposed of each month, but rather it is done so in bulk.
Number of obsolete units disposed of over a year
OIT = 
. .Average number of units in inventory
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Volunteer hours (VH) The volunteer hours (VH) metric is simply the number
of hours provided by volunteers to the GDC in any given month. In addition to
connecting partners to GIK, HHI seeks to provide a means for volunteers to become
involved with humanitarian work, and it for this reason (as well as the results of the
top-down analysis survey) that VH is selected as a KPI.
VH is valid since it accurately captures the amount of work that volunteers
contribute to HHI's operations, and is robust because this metric is comparable
to other organizations. However, it is not useful since it does not send a clear
signal of action to decision makers, nor is it integrative as it only concerns inventory
management processes. Further, the indicator lacks level of detail, in that an hour
of volunteer work does not signal more tangible concepts of performance.
VH = Total count of volunteer hours
Order processing metrics
Warehouse order cycle time (WOCT) The warehouse order cycle time (WOCT)
is the average number of days to process an order from entry to shipment. HHI will
ideally have a short WOCT as this indicates the organization can quickly process
orders. However, it is also important to note that, like DTS times, WOCT may
suffer when there are large number of outbound orders or inbound receipts.
It is recommended that HHI monitor the average count of days between each event
that makes up an entire warehouse order cycle-specifically, these include order entry
to release, release to pick, and pick to ship. By monitoring the combination of these
cycle times, the organization will have a better idea of what events are slowing down
(or speeding up) order processing.
Like DTS times, WOCT is a classic warehousing indicator and is thus robust and
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useful to decision makers. Further, since WOCT can be broken down into order
entry, release, pick, and shipment times, it carries a high level of detail. WOCT is
not valid or integrative, however, as it only concerns outbound ordering processes
and is likely dependent on receipt and order volume.
WOCT = Avg. count of days between order entry and order ship, per receipt
Outbound value (OV) The outbound value (OV) metric is given as the total
value of GIK supplied to partners from HHI's GDC. Like IV, this indicator is ex-
tremely important to the organization since product acquisition and distribution is
the primary purpose of their business. Additionally, OV ranked highest with IV in
regards to the top-down analysis survey.
OV is valid since it accurately captures the amount of GIK distributed by the
organization, and integrative because it considers both the ability for the organization
to advertise its product and distribute it to others. It is not robust nor useful, though,
as it is difficult to compare GIK distribution operations across organizations and does
not send a clear signal of action to decision makers.
OV = Total outbound value provided to partners
Total demand satisfied (TDS) The total demand satisfied (TDS) is the pro-
portion of value distributed to partners which is ordered. When a partner places an
order HHI does not always have sufficient inventory to satisfy it. Thus, TDS provides
a means for the organization to track how well their supply matches demand.
TDS is not currently compatible because the organization doesn't collect data on
what products were ordered, only what products were delivered. It also remains to
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be seen whether TDS is economic, as HHI would need to develop a standardized
means to collect and store order demand information. If HHI does adopt TDS as
a metric, it will be valid since it would accurately depict what products are being
requested and delivered, robust in that it would be comparable across moments of
time and other organizations, and integrative in that it merges both inbound receipt
and outbound order processes. Though it does not inherently hold a sufficient level
of detail, the organization can use TDS to determine what key items are in short
supply, and therefore what items to request from donors.
TDS = Total outbound value provided to partners
Total outbound value demanded by partners
Perfect order ratio (POR) The perfect order ratio (POR) indicates the percent-
age of orders processed by HHI that are made without error. Of course, orders that
are incorrectly processed is bad for the customer and HHIL. Ideally, the firm should
shoot for a POR of 100%, though realistically a more reasonable benchmark is 99%
due to the high volume of volunteer staff that make up HHI warehouse operations.
HHI does not currently collect the required information to calculate POR, and
thus it is not compatible. It is suggested that the organization begin to take note of
calls from partners who claim orders were not processed or shipped correctly. This
should be a more accurate exercise for HHI as they recently changed their handling
fee policy to charge partners by the line item as opposed to pallet volume; thus, HHI
is now more likely to hear from a partner if their order was incorrect. Of course, not
all partners may express concern if their order is not perfect, and as a consequence
POR is likely to be artificially high.
POR as a metric is robust and useful in that it is easily interpretable, compa-
rable across firms, and provides a clear message to organizational leadership. It is
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also behaviorally sound as it will incentivize logistics and warehouse to improve out-
bound order picking. At the same time, however, POR lacks validity since HHI may
not necessarily hear of every incorrect order, and is not integrative in that it only
considers outbound ordering processes.
POR = Count of perfectly processed 
orders
Total count of orders
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Table 3.13: Selected KPIs for HHI
Logistics
activity Equation
Dock-to-stock time DTS Donation Avg. count of days between dock-to-stock, per
processing receipt
Donor concentra- DCR Donation Value received from largest donors4,s
tion ratio processing Total value received from all donors
DonationInbound value IV . Total inbound value received from donorsprocessing
Damaged product DPR Donation Count of inbound receipts with damaged product
ratio processing Total count of inbound receipts
Inventory turns IT Inventory Number of units sold over a year
management Average number of units in inventory
Warehouse usage WUR Inventory Number of rack locations utilized
ratio management Total number of rack locations
Obsolete inventory OIT Inventory Number of obsolete units disposed of over a year
turns management Average number of units in inventory
Volunteer hours VH Inventory Total count of volunteer hours
management
Warehouse order WOCT Order Avg. count of days between order entry and
cycle time processing order ship, per receipt
OrderOutbound value OV pr .e Total outbound value provided to partners
processmng
Total demand satis- TDS Order Total outbound value provided to partners
fied processing Total outbound value demanded by partners
Perfect order ratio POR Order Count of perfectly processed ordersprocessing Total count of orders
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KPI
Table 3.14: Evaluation of individual KPIs
Evaluation DTS DCR IV DPR IT WUR OIT VH WOCT OV TDS POR Count
criteria
Validity - + + - - + + - 6 /12
Robustness - - - + + - + - + ~ + + 8 /12
Usefulness + + - + - - + - + + 7/ 12
Integration - - - + - ± - + + - 4/ 12
Economy - + -|- - | ± + - - 10/ 12
Compatibility + + + - - - - -+ -|- - 7/ 12
Level of + + _ _ _ _ 
_ + 
_ _ - 4/ 12
detail
Behavioral - __ + - + ± - _ - + + 7/ 12
soundness
Count 5/8 6/8 4/8 2/8 4/8 5/8 4/8 4/8 5/8 5/8 5/8 4/8 53 /96
Note: + signifies that the metric fulfills this criteria, whereas - signifies that the metric does not
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3.5.2 Measurement system
The performance measurement system composed of the individual KPIs observed in
the preceding section is now analyzed from a systems perspective given the criteria
defined by Caplice and Sheffi (1995). These six criteria include: comprehensive,
causally oriented, vertically integrated, horizontally integrated, internally comparable,
and useful.15
Internally comparable An internally comparable performance measurement sys-
tem recognizes and allows for trade-offs between different dimensions of performance.
From Table 3.14, it is clear that this system observes the primary trade-offs identified
by Caplice and Sheffi (1994)-specifically, those between integration and usefulness,
and robustness and validity. Using DTS time as an example, because it is very situ-
ationally specific (i.e., valid), it becomes less comparable (i.e., robust). Additionally,
because DTS is not able to coordinate activities across different functions (i.e., in-
tegrative), it provides more guidance for the particular function it does fit into (i.e.,
useful). The majority of measures in this system observe these types of trade-offs,
the main exception being TDS.
Useful A measurement system is useful if it is readily understandable by decision
makers and provides a guide for action to be taken. First, of the twelve indicators
i5 Caplice and Sheffi (1995) define these performance measurement system criteria as follows.
Comprehensive indicates that the system captures all relevant constituencies and stakeholders for
the process. Causally oriented indicates that that the system tracks those activities and indicators
that influence future, as well as current, performance. Vertically integrated indicates that the system
translates the overall firm strategy to all decision makers within the organization and is connected to
the proper reward system. Horizontally integrated indicates that the system includes all pertinent
activities, functions, and departments along the process. Internally comparable indicates that the
system recognizes and allows for trade-offs between the different dimensions of performance. And
useful indicates that the system is is readily understandable by decision makers and provides a
guide for action to be taken.
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observed in Table 3.14, each is given as a simple and relatively straightforward ratio
or value. What is more difficult to determine, however, is whether these metrics
provide a guide for action. From an individual perspective, seven of the twelve
indicators observed here were determined to fit the usefulness criteria. Thus, the
majority of this system allows for inferences that can be directly acted upon. Those
that do not, on the other hand, usually indicate a quantification of the organization's
overall mission-these include IV, IT, VH, and OV. Thus, this system provides a mix
of both metrics that can be acted upon, and metrics that demonstrate high-level
organizational strategy.
Comprehensive A comprehensive performance system captures all relevant con-
stitutencies and stakeholders. This system developed here surely does, as it consid-
ers HHI logistics staff through inventory management metrics, the donors to HHI
through donation processing metrics, and partners to HHI through order processing
metrics. In addition, HHI staff that are not directly related to the logistics depart-
ment derive value from this system, since it touches on other departments within the
organization such as resource development, and monitoring and evaluation.
Causally oriented A metric system is causally oriented if it tracks those activities
that influence future and current performance. For one, this system certainly tracks
and influences current performance, as the measures provided here can be evaluated
on a continual basis. Further, seven of the twelve indicators were observed to be
useful in that they provide decision makers a legitimate means for action. This
system is therefore causally oriented, since it allows the organization to continuously
monitor performance, as well as influence current and future operations.
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Vertically integrated A metric system that is vertically integrated translates the
overall firm strategy to decision makers within the organization, and is connected
to the proper reward system. First, this system focuses on monitoring the primary
mission of HHI, which is to connect medical products that are useful and of high-
quality to partners. For example, DTS and WOCT monitor time efficiency of GIK
receipt and distribution, DPR and POR monitor the quality of these flows, TDS
monitors the ability of HHI to connect partners to these products, and IV, OV,
and IT monitor the volume of GIK that is received and distributed. Additionally,
the majority of these indicators are behaviorally sound, by either discouraging or
preventing system gaming. Thus, this system can be said to be vertically integrated.
Horizontally integrated Finally, horizontal integration indicates that the sys-
tem includes all pertinent activities, functions, and departments along the process.
Although this system is integrated across logistics activities and touches on other
departments within HHI, it is not horizontally integrated across the organization
as a whole. Another KPI system could be developed from a organizational level;
however, this system as described here is specific to the logistics department.
3.5.3 Monitoring the system and suggested presentation
The proposed logistics KPI system outlined in this section was handed off to HHI's
Director of Global Logistics in the spring of 2013. Included with the system was the
process by which each indicator can be calculated, its usefulness as a performance
metric, and how it should be interpreted. A Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was also
passed on to HHI which included the value of each indicator calculated for as far
back in time as possible. Ultimately, categorizing KPIs into a single repository like a
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spreadsheet makes it easy to analyze and visually represent the system with respect
to time, and also helps to standardize the process by which KPIs are recorded.
In regards to presentation, it is suggested that this system be discussed at both
HHI's Logistics Staff and Leadership Team meetings. First, it is recommended that
at Logistics Staff meetings each individual KPI be discussed in detail to develop
a greater understanding of why positive trends, negative trends, or anomolies, if
any, are occuring. Second, at Leadership Team meetings, it is recommended that
the Director of Global Logistics distributes the KPI system as described above, and
discusses a few metrics that were highlighted as noteworthy during the Logistics Staff
meeting. The lessons learned in the Logistics Staff meeting can provide leadership
within HHI a better understanding of the state of warehouse activities.
In addition, and perhaps most important of all, presenting logistics KPIs at the
Leadership Team meeting will help to merge those other functions of the organiza-
tion, such as fundraising, marketing, and finance, with HHI's logistics and supply
chain operations. Ultimately, many of the metrics outlined in this section, while
specific to supply chain operations, have repurcussions that extend to other areas of
the organization. Thus, this performance measurement system will allow the entire
organization to better understand and guide its operations and strategy as a whole.
3.6 Summary of approach
Although this case study is specific to HHI, its over-arching purpose is to demon-
strate a process that is transferable to other humanitarian organizations interested
in developing their own KPI systems. The list below summarizes the approach to
this study, which can be used by others for this purpose.
1. Acquire foundational information concerning the organization, including its history, opera-
112
tional practices, available data, and high-level strategy
2. Conduct bottom-up analysis of logistics data to identify what activities are important to the
firm's day-to-day operations, as well as relevant trends and non-trends in these activities
3. Conduct top-down analysis of organization-i.e., through direct discussions, a survey, etc.-
to identify the firm's mission and objectives in regards to logistics and supply chain opera-
tions, and what desired outcomes are representative of this strategy
4. Merge bottom-up analytical approach with top-down qualitative approach to build prelimi-
nary KPI system
5. Showcase preliminary system with relevant stakeholders within the organization for feedback
6. Build final KPI system based off reception and feedback, and determine its mode of presen-
tation
7. Use system operationally and modify with time, as appropriate1 6
16As this case study was completed in the spring of 2013, there was no time to carry out this
final step. Of course, KPI systems are not permanent creations and must change with respect to
organizational goals as well as any identified flaws.
113
Part II
Performance Measurement and the
Humanitarian Marketplace
114
Chapter 4
Market Characterization and
Implications
"Presuming to identify trends in humanitarian action is a perilous business. The
very meaning of humanitarianism has become elusive, as a new set of actors has
claimed it as part of a new, more interventionist international order. As the definition
of humanitarianism has been stretched, so identifying the actors on the humanitarian
stage has become more difficult. The cast of characters has changed significantly in
recent years, to include new, often unfamiliar faces."
-Macrae (2002, pp. 5)
The purpose of this chapter is to identify quantitative trends in the humanitar-
ian marketplace using high-level non-profit IRS data, and to compare them to those
depicted in recent academic and organizational literature with the ultimate goal of
characterizing the competitive nature of this market. First, this chapter defines the
humanitarian and philanthropic marketplace in general, discusses its participants
and their incentives, and identifies important differences between for-profit and phil-
anthropic markets. Data derived from the National Center for Charitable Statistics
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(NCCS) is then used to define macro trends in the United States non-profit interna-
tional relief sector, focusing on four areas-market expansion, fundraising, sources of
funding, and concentration. Additionally, in this section the merits and limitations
of using NCCS data to identify trends in this fashion are discussed. Finally, those
trends observed in the literature are compared to those observed quantitatively in
an attempt to characterize the competitive nature of the humanitarian marketplace.
4.1 The philanthropic marketplace
For some, it is difficult to imagine that the environment in which organizations,
donors, and recipients of charity interact should be thought of as a "marketplace."
However, charity can be purchased and exchanged much in the same way as goods
and services in traditional markets. Further, participants in the philanthropic sector
are not immune to interests and incentives found in the for-profit sector.' Thus, one
should regard the humanitarian relief and philanthropic system in general as dynamic
markets, where firms compete for donations and the ability to serve beneficiaries.
4.1.1 Participants and incentives
The market for philanthropic goods and services, like traditional markets, includes
suppliers-those that give to charity-and demanders-the fund-raising charities
themselves (Andreoni, 2006). There is, of course, a third layer to this model that
is perhaps most important yet often forgotten, and that is the beneficiaries of char-
ity. At the most basic level, the philanthropic marketplace consists of these three
'The firms that provide charity are nearly always non-profit organizations, and therefore the
philanthropic sector should be thought of as a subset of the non-profit sector. This is largely due
to the fact that charities, generally speaking, provide social goods which are much easier to raise
revenue for if under non-profit status.
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participants-donors, service providers, and beneficiaries.
In regards to the relationship between donors and non-profit firms, Wolpert and
Reiner (1984) explain that each party has a wide range of possible motivations and
expectations concerning their own and the other party's actions. The authors argue
that preferences over control and the targeting of donations are key areas in which
donors and charities can disagree. For one, it is understandable that charitable firms
would generally like donations not to be targeted, as this allows them to maintain
greater control over their operations and avoid inefficient distribution of donations as
seen in, for instance, the aid abundance problem. At the same time, however, donors
often prefer to see their donations put towards projects that either align with their
own philosophies or are in the public eye for promotional purposes. Thus, between
service providers and donors, tension exists in regards to the degree of freedom that
charities have over their revenues.
Additionally, Cooley and Ron (2002) insist that interactions between providers
and beneficiaries of aid, like those between donors and providers, can be modeled as
a principal-agent relationship. The authors argue that without adequate monitor-
ing, recipients of aid may be incentivized to appropriate the provider's resources for
opportunistic gain, while at the same time the provider may be disincentivized to
report this activity unless donors can credibly guarantee that funding will continue.
There then exists a situation, described by Cooley and Ron as the multiple-principals
problem, where recipients of aid are able to play contractors and donors against each
other. Of course, this environment can only exist where there is sufficient interest in
assistance-when interest is scarce, so too will be aid.
The relationship between donor and beneficiary is perhaps the most interesting,
however, mainly because neither party comes into contact with one another. Thus,
feedback regarding the quality of goods and services delivered to beneficiaries arrives
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to the donor via the provider itself, or in rare cases the media and government.2
Ultimately, this disconnect between donor and beneficiary serves as one of the main
drivers behind the problem of ascertaining the performance of philanthropic organi-
zations, yet it is also necessary for the efficient delivery of aid.3
4.1.2 Philanthropic versus for-profit markets
Though philanthropy should be regarded as a market in the same way as traditional
for-profit markets, there are a number of key differences between the two that must
be addressed. First, Glaeser (2006) identifies the three legal differences between non-
profit and for-profit firms. For one, the revenues of non-profit organizations are not
taxed by the federal government. Second, non-profits are held by the non-distribution
constraint, which prevents them from disbursing profits to owners or employees.
Finally, non-profits do not have owners and their boards are self-perpetuating-that
is, they can indefinitely renew themselves.
Although the success of many for-profit firms can be attributed to the investments
of its shareholders, non-profits do not have this luxury. This raises complications
regarding the existence of non-profits in an economical sense. As noted by The
Economist (1998):
"For economists, the non-profit organisation is something of an evolutionary odd-
ity. Without the forces that drive conventional firms-shareholders, stock options
and, of course, profits-it has still managed to thrive in the market economy."
Thus, instead of thinking of the non-profit in terms of those forces referenced
above, the existence of non-profit firms can be explained as a result of the types of
2For example, donors may hear of the misappropriation of charitable funds through the media
in cases of fraud or other forms of scandal.
3Imagine the alternative, where each donor sought to directly provide their charity to beneficia-
ries. This would obviously be a wildly inefficient system.
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services and goods they provide. As seen in the Urban Institute's Nonprofit Almanac,
public charities mainly locate themselves within the education, health care, and
human services sectors. These are principally social goods-that is, they are meant to
benefit the community or society as a whole. Accordingly, non-profits in general have
a much easier time raising revenue for social goods than for-profit firms, as donors
have more confidence in non-profits that their contributions will be distributed for
that particular social cause. 4
Further, since the performance of non-profits is inherently difficult observe, the
methods used by donors to choose which providers to fund are primarily subjective.
As a result, advertising, marketing, and fundraising activities become the primary
means by which firms acquire revenue from donors, rather than by demonstrating
value through its service quality. The goal of the organization also plays an important
role. Missions of international relief NGOs, for instance, vary by a wide margin;
thus, corporate and individual donors can use the NGO's mission as a tool to align
their philanthropic objectives and strategy (e.g., marketing, political, etc.) with
those of the providing firm (Porter and Kramer, 2002). Furthermore, word-of-mouth,
reputation, and accredidation improve the competitiveness of the firm, and in fact
there are existing services that will, for a fee, provide users charity verification and
matching services. 5 Finally, while IRS Form 990 data can offer some insight into
the firm's operations, this information can only reasonably be used to identify firms
that are financially weak and one should hesitate to use it as a tool to measure
programmatic capabilities across various firms.
4Hospitals are a notable exception to this rule, as many exist in for-profit form. However, this
is largely due to the fact that hospitals can raise revenues in other ways besides direct donations
such as, for example, charging patients or insurance providers for care.
5For example, GuideStar (http://www.guidestar.org).
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4.2 Quantitative macro trends in the United States
non-profit international relief sector
This study arose out of an interest in the ways in which market mechanisms within
the international relief sector operate inefficiently. In particular, the disconnect be-
tween donors and beneficiaries, and the inherent difficulty in distinguishing quality
amongst non-profit organizations likely results in inefficient matching between donors
and humanitarian firms. Thus, it is an interesting exercise to determine how mecha-
nisms used to match donations to service providers can be improved, and within this
context, what role signaling quality through performance measurement can play.
To begin, however, it is fundamentally important to characterize the structure of
the humanitarian marketplace. This is due to the fact that different market struc-
tures will inherently imply different policy prescriptions-for example, a marketplace
with excessive competition will act different than one which is well-sized, which acts
different than one which is cartelized. Therefore, this study first attempts to identify
quantitative macro trends in the international relief sector in order to analyze the
structure of this market, specifically in regards to market expansion and volume, the
importance of fundraising, sources of funding, and concentration.
4.2.1 Research methodology and dataset
Dataset and approach
The data used in this study is obtained publicly through the National Center for
Charitable Statistics (NCCS), which serves as the national repository of data on the
non-profit sector in the United States.6 The NCCS was established in 1982 as a
'See http://nccs.urban.org/ (accessed 21 February 2013).
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project under the Urban Institute's Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy (CNP).
NCCS mainly derives its data from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filings. Specif-
ically, organizations that wish to be designated under federally tax-exempt status
must file an IRS Form 990 annually, which provides information on the organiza-
tion's revenue stream, balance sheet, program service accomplishments, compensa-
tion, and other areas pertinent to non-profits. The IRS Form 990 must also be made
available for public scrutiny by federal statue for all non-profit organizations with
incomes greater than US$50,000. 7 Notably, there are certain non-profits that are
not required to file an IRS Form 990, including organizations that have not received
tax-exempt status from the IRS, most faith-based organizations (e.g., churches), and
state institutions, amongst others.
Within the NCCS database, data obtained for this study is derived from Core
Financial Files (CFF) between 1989 and 2010.8 The CFF includes approximately
60 financial variables (i.e., fields) from the IRS Form 990 and 990-EZ. From these
files, 501(c)(3) public charities that classify themselves with a National Taxonomy
of Exempt Entities (NTEE) code of Q33, which applies to "International Relief"
non-profits, are isolated.' Organizations with this classification are defined as:
'Specifically, non-profit organizations with incomes greater than or equal to US$200,000 or assets
greater than or equal to US$500,000 must file an IRS Form 990. Those organizations with incomes
less than US$200,000 and assets less than US$500,000 are required to file a Form 990-EZ, which is
a shorter and less-detailed version of the Form 990. Further, organizations with incomes less than
US$50,000 are allowed to file a Form 990-N, which is a simple eight-question, electronic return.
This analysis considers data derived from IRS Forms 990 and 990-EZ, which are the only non-profit
return forms of which the IRS provides electronic images.
8 See http://nces.urban.org/database/overview.cfm (accessed 21 February 2013).
9The NTEE classification guidelines can be found at: https://nccs.urban.org/classification/NTEE.cfm
(accessed 21 February 2013). The code is typically given as an alphanumeric, beginning with a
single letter and followed by a two-digit (i.e., decile) code. The first letter represents the broad
subsector of the non-profit, while the decile code subdivides the subsector into specific activity
areas. For example, the "Q" in Q33 applies to International, Foreign Affairs, and National Security
organizations, while the "33" designates the organization specific to International Relief.
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"Organizations that work to relieve poverty in developing countries by providing
funds, technical assistance and supplies which improve the health, education, welfare,
social well-being and self-reliance of individuals and families. Also included are or-
ganizations that provide relief services in response to a major disaster or large-scale
emergency that occurs abroad." 0
Thus, humanitarian organizations make up a subset of all Q33 organizations,
which is important to consider throughout this analysis. Any comments made on
this dataset hereafter will be applicable to the international relief sector in general,
as opposed to humanitarian organizations specifically.
For each CFF year, all observations are filtered high-to-low by total revenue, and
the following variables for those organizations in each year that fall within the top
25 of all organizations in terms of revenue are observed:
1. Rank in total revenue that calendar year
2. Employer identification number (EIN)
3. Fiscal yearli
4. Name of organization
5. Total revenue
6. Fundraising expenses
7. Total expenses
10See http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/kbfiles/322/NTEE-CC-Manual-2007a.pdf (accessed 21
February 2013).
"When the image of an IRS Form 990 for an organization from a calendar year is missing, NCCS
will take a Form 990 of that organization from the following or previous calendar year to maintain
continuity in rankings. Thus, fiscal year and calendar year will occasionally not match up perfectly.
This is somewhat rare, and is not believed to impact the results of the analysis.
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8. Revenue from government grants12
9. Revenue from indirect public support
10. Revenue from direct public support
Additionally, the Business Master File (BMF) from the NCCS database is ob-
served for each year between 1989 and 2010 to obtain general financial information
on all Q33 organizations filing with the IRS." The information from the BMF allows
for nformation on the top 25 firms in the international relief sector in terms of rev-
enue to be cross-referenced with aggregate information from the sector as a whole.
The following fields are observed from the BMF:
1. Non-zero, non-null observations' 4
2. Minimum observed revenue
3. Maximum observed revenue
4. Average observed revenue
5. Median observed revenue
6. Standard deviation of observed revenue
7. Total observed revenue
There are a number of reasons why this dataset is particularly attractive from
a market analysis standpoint. First, it provides hard numbers on private philan-
thropic giving where quantitative information lacks severely. For instance, although
12The fields for revenue from government grants, revenue from indirect public support, and
revenue from direct public support were not included on the IRS Form 990 until 1998; thus, this
data is only available between 1998 and 2010.
13See https://nces.urban.org/database/overview.cfm (accessed 21 February 2013).
"Non-zero, non null observations indicate the precise count of Q33 organizations filing a Form
990 or 990-EZ to the IRS that calendar year.
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data concerning government contributions to international relief and humanitarian
endeavours is decent and is collected through reputable institutions such as the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and World Bank,
Randel and German (2002) note that there is no standard method for recording pri-
vate contributions to humanitarian assistance, while Fearon (2008) goes as far as to
describe the data on private contributions as "terrible." Second, those numbers de-
rived from the NCCS database are obtained from forms that are filed to the IRS, the
US government agency responsible for tax collection and tax law enforcement; thus,
these forms are assumed to be filled out in good faith and as such are reliable.15
Third, this study is not the first to use aggregated IRS Form 990 data to arrive
at conclusions of market structure. Notably, Frumkin and Kim (2001), Castaneda
et al. (2007), and Thornton and Belski (2010) all use data derived from the IRS
Form 990 to draw empirical conclusions on the non-profit sector. Above all, how-
ever, the primary reason for using this dataset is that it allows for comparisons across
actual quantitative figures with qualitative information as observed in literature on
international relief and humanitarain organizations.
Dataset limitations
There are, of course, some notable limitations that come with drawing conclusions
from IRS Form 990 data. First, only organizations that are tax-exempt entities
within the United States government are required to complete a form; thus, informa-
tion on international relief and humanitarian organizations that operate outside the
United States are not included in the NCCS database. Second, there are likely to be
150f course, both for-profit and non-profit organizations have been known to accidently and
purposefully misrepresent themselves to the IRS. However, for the sake of this analysis these in-
stances are assumed to occur at an insignificant rate compared to those organizations that represent
themselves honestly and correctly.
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errors either accidentally or purposefully when organizations fill out the Form 990, as
well as when the NCCS compiles this information into their database. However, since
conclusions are drawn from a large number of organizations per calendar year and
occurrences of accidental or purposeful misrepresentation exist few and far between,
this is assumed to have a negligible impact on the results of this analysis. Finally,
and most importantly, the small subsets of fields on the Form 990 only allow for
broad generalizations concerning the non-profit sector as a whole, rather than more
targeted conclusions such as the performance of specific organizations. As Tuckman
(1998, pp. 190) argues:
"Existing data collection instruments, such as Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Forms 990 [sic], are neither well designed to capture commercial activities nor are they
suited to evaluate how effectively a charitable mission is carried out either absolutely or
relative to the profit-driven mission. Rought rules of thumb-such as the percentage
of donated revenues devoted to programmatic uses or the percentage of revenues
from unrelated business income-will not be adequate either as measures of fiscal
responsibility or of management effectiveness."
Thus, although the IRS Form 990 provides a wealth of data to be collected and
analyzed, it is important to remember that any conclusions drawn from this form
must be carefully crafted as not to overextend analytical boundaries.
4.2.2 Revenue and market volume
To begin, the total revenue acquired by US non-profit international firms is observed
with respect to time, as well as the total number of active, tax-exempt firms. Fig-
ure 4-1 illustrates the exponential growth in the number of firms in this market. In
1989, there were 219 acting international relief organizations. By 2010, the sector
had grown over ten-fold to 2,307 acting firms.
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Figure 4-1: Count of US non-profit international relief firms, 1989-2010
The total revenue to this sector has also grown exponentially, as depicted in
Figure 4-2. In 1989, international relief non-profits in the US raised US$1.3 billion in
revenue, primarily from cash donations, gifts-in-kind, and service fees. By 2010, this
had grown to US$11.5 billion. Notably, the market as a whole took a hit in funding
after 2008, when total revenues were at a high of US$13.1 billion.
Additionally, the growth in total revenue of this sector is observed with respect
to various revenue brackets. Figure 4-3 illustrates this growth for the four largest
firms in terms of revenue (orange), firms 5 through 8 (green), firms 9 through 25
(red), and all others (blue). Though each revenue bracket has expanded, the eight
largest firms in the market have experienced the most extreme growth. These same
firms took the largest hit in terms of funding between 2008 and 2010.16
1
"To serve as a reference, the largest international relief organizations in the US over the last ten
years have traditionally been AmeriCares, Feed the Children, Food For The Poor, International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and World Vision International.
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Figure 4-2: Revenue to US non-profit international relief sector, 1989-2010
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Figure 4-3: International relief non-profits by revenue bracket, 1989-2010
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This growth is also represented as a percent change in the revenue of the average
organization within different brackets, as shown in Figure 4-4. Here, it is observed
that the average revenue of organizations within each bracket grew similarly from
1989 to 1998; however, from 1998 to 2010, the largest 25 organizations and specifically
the top eight have grown the most dramatically. Notably, the average revenue of all
other organizations not in the top 25 of the market has remained relatively flat since
1989, and has perhaps decreased if inflation is taken into account.
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Figure 4-4: Percent change in average revenue of international non-profits within
revenue brackets (normalized to 100% in 1998), 1989-2010
4.2.3 Fundraising expenses
Trends regarding the fundraising expenses of international relief organizations were
then observed from the CFF. First, the fundraising expense ratio (FER)-calculated
as the percent of the firm's expenses used for fundraising activities within a given
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year-was considered for the largest 25 firms in the market in terms of total revenue.
Figure 4-5 plots the average FER of the largest 25 organizations with respect to time.
Excluded from this dataset are those organizations that reported a FER less than
0.1% in any given year, as the accuracy of these data points is debatable. Interest-
ingly, the percentage of expenses international relief firms place towards fundraising
has decreased over time, from approximately 10% on average in 1989 to roughly 5%
in 2010; however, it does appear that the average FER for these large organizations
may have plateaued at this 5% mark in recent years.
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Figure 4-5: Average fundraising expense ratio (FER) for largest 25 international
relief non-profits, 1989-2010
In addition to observing fundraising with respect to expenses, fundraising is con-
sidered with respect to the total revenue that an organization acquires in a given
year. Essentially, if a clear relationship is observed between fundraising and captured
revenue, one may begin to better estimate as to what degree fundraising activities
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benefit international relief organizations in terms of funding.
Figure 4-6 serves as a starting point for this analysis by graphically representing
the fundraising expenses an organization occurs with respect to the total revenue it
acquires for the largest 25 firms in the market. Again, those observations in which
an organization reports a FER less than 0.1% are also exluded from this analysis
due to concerns regarding their accuracy. In this plot, each series of colored dots
represents a unique organization between 1989 and 2010, and each point represents
the fundraising expenses and total revenue for a single organization in a given year. 17
For instance, the light blue dot annotated in Figure 4-6 represents Feed the Children
in 2006, when the organization incurred fundraising costs of US$72.6 million and
acquired US$649.8 million in total revenue.
7Because only the top 25 firms are observed for each calendar year, many of the data series that
represent organizations consist of fewer than the 22 points that span the 1989 to 2010 timeframe,
since many organizations may be in the top 25 in terms of revenue one year and then drop out in
subsequent years.
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Although it is somewhat difficult to observe trends from Figure 4-6 due to its
density, it does begin to illustrate the fact that levels of fundraising will impact
different organizations to varying degrees. Figure 4-7 attempts to clarify this point by
isolating Figure 4-6 for three organizations-Heart to Heart International, Food for
the Hungry, and Children International. 8 From this figure, we see that fundraising
expenses and total revenue for these organizations are linearly related. In fact, these
terms appear to be linearly related for nearly all firms within this dataset, though
some provide trend lines that are better fits than others.
An important conclusion from this analysis is that each firm within this sector
has what can be referred to as a unique "marginal benefit of fundraising" (MBF) that
is essentially constant. For instance, given this plot, Heart to Heart International
may speculate that their MBF is 163.3-that is, for every fundraising dollar they
incur, they can expect approximately US$163.3 in total revenue.1 9 Notably, one
major limitation of this analysis is that, as previously mentioned, the total revenue
of an organization consists of both cash donations and GIK. This is problematic
for two main reasons. First, organizations themselves often value GIK internally,
and thus there may be different assignments across relief firms for similar products.
Second, and more importantly, fundraising expenses are not necessarily used for the
acquisition of GIK. For instance, Heart to Heart International only fundraises for
cash donations; thus, a future analysis may segregate cash from total revenue and
provide a clearer picture on the MBF for international relief organizations.
18These organizations were chosen to represent Figure 4-7 for two reasons. First, their fundraising
expenses and total revenue values are similar, and can therefore be easily viewed on a single plot.
Second, these organizations provide good visual representations that these terms are linearly related.
In reality, some organizations allow for better evidence of this assertion than others.
MBF values of Food for the Hungry and Children International are 19.2 and 8.5, respectively.
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Figure 4-7: Revenue and fundraising expenses of select organizations, 1989-2010
4.2.4 Distribution of funding sources
Beginning in 1998, the IRS Form 990 required non-profits to identify the value of re-
ceived donations from three separate funding sources-direct public support, indirect
public support, and government contributions. GuideStar, which provides informa-
tion on non-profit firms in the United States, defines these sources as follows:20
" Direct public support-contributions received directly from individuals and foundations.
* Indirect public support-contributions received through federated fundraising campaigns
such as the United Way or the Combined Federal Campaign. Also included here are monies
received from affiliated organizations (parent, subordinate, or supporting organizations).
" Government contributions (grants)-contributions from federal, state or local governments
that are considered to provide a direct benefit to the general public. These contributions are
distinct from monies received from government contracts or fees for services [sic].21
From Figure 4-8, donations from direct public sources provides the greatest per-
cent contribution to the largest 25 international relief firms, and has been increasing
steadily since the early 2000s at a rate of 0.7% per year. The percent contribution
from government grants has also increased over this period, at a slightly lesser rate
of 0.6%. Conversely, the contribution from indirect public support has decreased at
a rate of 1.3%. In 2010, approximately 70% of revenue to the largest 25 international
relief organizations came from direct public support, 24% from government grants,
and 6% from indirect public support.
20See http://www.guidestar.org/rxa/news/articles/2001-older/understanding-the-irs-form-
990.aspx (accessed 2 March 2013).
2 1GuideStar notes that the distinction between government grants and contracts is "tricky." In
their words: "For example, suppose that a local government gives a rural health clinic $5,000 to
support its operations. The clinic decides to use this entire amount to provide free Lyme disease
inoculations to county residents. This is a government grant. If the $5,000 was given to the clinic
in order to inoculate government workers against Lyme disease, and stipulated that the money be
used for that purpose alone, it would be considered a government contract."
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Figure 4-8: Funding sources of largest international relief non-profits, 1989-2010
4.2.5 Concentration
In microeconomic and market theory, the actions of firms in any given sector fall
somewhere in between monopoly and perfect competition. Concentration-that is,
the market share of the sector's largest firms-has traditionally provided the most
useful corollary to competition. An example of a highly concentrated market is in
aircraft engine manufacturing, where a small number of firms provide the majority
of sales to the market (i.e., General Electric, Rolls-Royce, and Pratt & Whitney).
Conversely, the machine shop sector is an example of a highly unconcentrated market,
where a large number of firms fight for an extremely small share of total sales.
The level of competition in a market is typically inversely related to the level of
competition. Thus, industries that are highly unconcentrated experience competi-
tion at greater levels than industries that are highly concentrated. This is because
concentrated sectors make it relatively easier for the largest organizations to dictate
price or movements in the market, and may reduce threats of competitors by, for
example, raising barriers to entry.2 2 Firms in unconcentrated markets do not have
this luxury, and are more prone to competition directly based on quality and price.
To judge market competition, studies will rely on measures based on the num-
ber and relative size of firms a sector (Baker, 2001). Though there a number of
indices that measure concentration, the two most commonly used are the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (H-HI) and concentration ratios (Bikker and Haaf, 2000).23
First, concentration ratios are defined as the total market share of a given number
22Baker (2001) defines six forces that modify traditional competitive dynamics of markets, in-
cluding effects on the mobility of purchasers, ease of entry, extent of horizontal and / or vertical
integration between firms, the presence of non-profit entities, government regulation, and collusion.
2 3Traditionally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is abbreviated as HHI. However, because Heart
to Heart International has already been referred to by this acronym throughout this thesis, the
acronym "H-HI" is adopted to help differentiate between the two.
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of firms. In this study, three concentration ratios are observed in this sector-firm-
four, firm-eight, and firm-25.2 ' Figure 4-9 plots these metrics between 1989 and 2010.
Here, it is observed that each concentration ratio is experiencing a slightly decreasing
trend over time. In 2010, the international relief sector's firm-four (green), firm-eight
(orange), and firm-25 (blue) ratios were 35%, 54%, and 83%, respectively; in 1989,
these ratios were 44%, 67%, and 93%. To serve as a reference, in 2007 the firm-four,
firm-eight, and firm-202 ' ratios of the aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing
sector were 74.3%, 81.3%, 89.4%, respectively, and 1.7%, 2.9%, and 5.6% for the
machine shop sector (US Department of Commerce, 2013).
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Figure 4-9: Selected concentration ratios, 1989-2010
24Firm-four, for example, is defined as the total revenue acquired by the four largest firms in the
market that year, divided by the total revenue of the sector.
25The difference between firm-20 and firm-25 ratios can be considered neglible for the purposes
of this study.
2 6The "aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing" and "machine shop" sectors have North
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes of 336412 and 332710, respectively.
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Second, H-HI is perhaps the most common measure of competition in a market.
It is calculated as the sum of the squares of the market shares of the n largest firms
within the sector, and is used as a screening tool for the United States Department
of Justice when examining horizontal mergers (US Department of Justice, 2012).27
Figure 4-10 plots the H-HI for the international non-profit relief sector between
1989 and 2010. Like the concentration ratios observed for this sector, its H-HI has
been decreasing over this time. Specifically, the H-HI was calculated to be 0.071 and
0.046 in 1989 and 2010, respectively. To compare to the extremes, the H-HI for the
aircraft engine and engine parts manufacturing, and machine shop sectors was 0.242
and 0.0003 in 2007, respectively (US Department of Commerce, 2013).
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Figure 4-10: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 1989-2010
27There are two forms of the Herfindahl-Hirschnan Index (H-HI). The first considers market share
as a decimal between 0 and 1, and thus ranges between - and 1. The second considers market
share as a percentage, and thus ranges between 10',000 and 10,000. Here we use the first form, where
H-HI = implies perfect competition and H-HI = 1 implies monopoly. The Department of Justice
uses an n value of 50, though an n of 25 is used for this study due to data limitations.
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Lastly, the total revenue acquired by international relief non-profits is observed
with respect to the H-HI between 1989 and 2010, as illustrated in Figure 4-11. This
allows for a clean visual representation of how the concentration and volume of this
market has changed over time. Beginning in 1989, the sector had an H-HI of 0.046
and a total revenue of US$1.3 billion, as represented by the data point in the lower
right of Figure 4-11. In 2010, the sector had an H-HI of 0.071 and revenues of
US$11.5 billion, as represented by the data point in the upper right of this plot.
There are three distinct periods that are present on this plot, each illustrated
by a red arrow. First, between 1989 to 1998 the market saw a steep decrease in
concentration and a slight increase in total revenue-in fact, if inflation is taken into
account, revenue would appear to be relatively static over this time. This period
aligns with similar gains in the total number of acting firms in the market and total
revenue as depicted in Figures 4-1 and 4-2, which essentially diluted the market
shares acquired by the sector's largest organizations.
Second, between 1998 to 2008 the market saw a sharp increase in total revenue,
accompanied by a slight increase in concentration. This matches with significant
increases in funding to this sector relative to the growth of organizations, as seen in
Figure 4-2, and in particular to the sector's largest firms, from Figure 4-3.
Finally, between 2008 to 2010 the market took its first major hit in terms of
total acquired revenue, dropping from US$13.1 to US$11.5 billion. Additionally, the
sector experienced a sharp decrease in concentration over this time. This aligns with
the decline in funding after 1998 as seen in Figure 4-2, and especially to the largest
organizations in the market, as depicted in Figure 4-3. Relative to Department of
Justice standards, this market currently and throughout its history has existed in a
highly unconcentrated state (US Department of Justice, 2012).
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4.3 Characterizing the humanitarian marketplace
4.3.1 Synthesis of literary and quantitative trends
Growth
The analysis above has shown that the count of international relief non-profits in
the United States has grown exponentially over the last twenty years. This finding
agrees with the majority of literature regarding firm growth in the market. For
instance, Barnett and Weiss (2008b) argue that prior to the end of the Cold War a
small number of large international relief agencies and organizations had a virtual
monopoly on the delivery of humanitarian aid, whereas today the environment is
more competitive and crowded.
In addition, the quantitative observations regarding total funding to these organi-
zations are also supported in literature. Fearon (2008), who uses data on the funding
sources of NGOs that received grants from the US Agency for International Devel-
opment (USAID) between 1981 and 2004, notes a significant rise in emergency relief
aid during the early 1990s. The author suggests a number of reasons for this-first,
growth in aid funding reflects the increase in the total number of internally displaced
persons (IDPs) at the end of the Cold War; second, the complex of international and
governmental agencies as well as NGOs has succeeded in conceptualizing and "sell-
ing" IDPs as a category of persons requiring systematic humanitarian aid; and third,
shifting major-power foreign policies to "postmodern imperialism" or "neotrustee-
ship" led to an increased use of international interventions that pursued security,
developmental, and humanitarian goals. 28
Macrae (2002) agrees with this final assertion by Fearon. Throughout the 1990s,
28For a summary of "postmodern imperialism" and "neotrusteeship" policies, refer to Chapter 2.
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she argues that there was a developing consensus in the international community
that security was linked to development activities within failing states and their
neighbors, as made apparent by humanitarian interventions throughout the decade-
e.g., Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, East Timor, and Kosovo.2 9 In the 2000s, American-
led counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq further demonstrated an
increased interest in merging humanitarian and developmental goals with those of
security. Thus, these two decades established a new period in humanitarianism,
defined by Macrae (2002) as the "new security agenda."
As a result, changes in the humanitarian environment increased the demand for
services provided by international relief organizations, and broadened their man-
date to solicit funding from governments and private individuals, particularly in the
United States and European Union. Large-scale intervention activities at the end of
the 1990s and throughout the 2000s in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq
represented the solidification of this marriage between security and developmental
policies, paving the path for a surge in funding activities. This is why a spike in
funding is observed in 1998 to 2008, as seen in Figures 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4.
29The cases listed here are all United Nations-sanctioned interventions. United Task Force
(UNITAF) was an American-led operation in Somalia in 1992 and 1993 to create a protected
environment in which to deliver humanitarian aid. Operation Uphold Democracy was an American-
led operation in Haiti in 1994 and 1995 designed to remove the military regime established after
the 1991 Haitian coup d'6tat. United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) was
multinational-led and took place in Rwanda from 1993 to 1994 to aid the peace process between
the Hutu-dominated government and Tutsi-dominated rebels. United Nations Transitional Ad-
ministration in East Timor (UNTAET) was also multinational-led and served as an interim civil
administration between 1999 and 2002. Finally, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) was largely European-led and intended to ensure peaceful conditions for life in
Kosovo and advance stability in the western Balkans.
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Fundraising
As discussed previously, fundraising activities are fundamentally important to inter-
national relief organizations and the non-profit community in general. Frequently,
economic studies of non-profit behavior will model these firms as entities that ei-
ther allocate funds to programs or to raising revenue for programs. Castaneda et al.
(2007), for instance, assume three forms of expenditures by non-profits-program ser-
vices, promotional expenses, and administrative expenses-and show that increased
competition will also increase the fraction of donations used for promotional ex-
penditures (i.e., fundraising and marketing). In addition, Aldashev and Verdier
(2009, 2010) develop economic models that explore the structure of international
relief NGOs based on fundraising decisions, observing that, for example, national
and multinational NGOs can only coexist if the humanitarian market and returns to
scale on fundraising are sufficiently large.
As shown in Figure 4-5, the average FER for the largest 25 international relief or-
ganizations in the US has been decreasing over the last two decades, to approximately
5% of total expenditures today. This is coupled with a decrease in concentration as
seen in Figures 4-9 and 4-10, which generally suggests an increased competitive en-
vironment. Interestingly, this observation is counter to some suggestions in recent
literature regarding the topic of fundraising and competition that, as competition
increases, so too will expenditures to fundraising activities. Notably, as mentioned
in the paragraph above, Castaneda et al. (2007) observe through their model that an
increase in competition amongst non-profits will increase the fraction of donations
used for promotional expenditures. Further, an article from The Economist (2000)
at the turn of the millenium suggests that competition in the international relief
sector has forced NGOs to focus on fundraising rather than serving beneficiaries:
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"In the now-crowded relief market, campaigning groups must jostile for attention:
increasingly, NGOs compete and spend a lot of time and money marketing themselves.
Bigger ones typically spend 10% of their funds on marketing and fund-raising... The
focus of such NGOs can easily shift from finding solutions and helping needy recipients
to pleasing their donors and winning television coverage."
However, as mentioned above, observations from this analysis suggest that al-
though competition has theoretically increased due to a decrease in sectoral concen-
tration, fundraising expenditures have instead decreased relative to programmatic ex-
penditures. This can explained in four ways. First, the international non-profit relief
sector has assumed "free-market" characteristics, where increased competition has
forced NGOs to compete on the quality of their services rather than fundraising ac-
tivities. Second, there could be parallel changes in the non-profit environment-such
as improved modern media technologies (e.g., the Internet) or donor retention-that
have allowed fundraising expenses to drop even as competition has increased. Third,
the returns to scale on fundraising are large-that is, the larger the organization, the
more revenue it can acquire per fundraising dollar. And fourth, fundraising activities
serve as strategic complements to one another-that is, the returns on fundraising
activities increase with the effort exerted by other non-profits.
Given these four explanations, this paper argues that this phenomenon occurs
due to some combination of the final three. It is unlikely that the first explanation
is sufficient since humanitarian organizations do not typically compete on service
quality due to the inherent difficulties in conveying performance to donors. The last
three, however, provide reasonable conclusions, and in particular the fourth expla-
nation offers some interesting implications for this market. Aldashev et al. (2012),
for example, uses an economic model to explore the sustainability of coordination
between non-profits in the international relief environment. Specifically, the authors
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observe that if fundraising activities are strategic complements, then full coordination
and stability is possible amongst groups-that is, alliances can be formed. Further,
as noted in their study, this insight is important to take into account when consid-
ering governmental policies meant to encourage or discourage competitive behavior
amongst non-profit organizations.
Lastly, in regards to the observation that different international relief organiza-
tions have varying MBF values that are linear in nature, there were no examples
observed in this study from either academic or organizational literature that re-
fer to this phenomenon. Though there appears to be a linear relationship between
fundraising and total acquired revenue by these organizations to varying degrees, it
would be presumptuous to define total revenue as linearly dependent on fundraising
expenses for two reasons. First, because the total expenses of these organizations are
so heavily correlated to their total revenue, this relationship would appear linear if
the firm fixes from year to year the percentage of total expenses that it places towards
fundraising activities." Second, as mentioned previously, this analysis fails to isolate
total revenue into its cash and GIK components. This is particularly important as
the majority of international relief organizations, including those that focus on GIK
distribution, will only fundraise for cash.
Sources of funding
From Figure 4-8, it was observed that direct public support-that is, contributions
received directly from individuals and foundations-represents the largest source
funding to the top 25 international relief non-profits in the US at around 70% in 2010,
30For instance, if an organization decides to commit 5% of its total expenses to fundraising, and
assuming total expenses rise relative to total revenues (which they certainly do in this sector), then
the organization's fundraising expenses will be linearly dependent on its total revenue.
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and appears to be growing. Government grants made up approximately 24% of these
organization's funding in 2010 and also appears to be growing, while indirect public
support-that is, contributions received through federated fundraising campaigns-
made up only 6% of funding and is on the decline. Thus, this dataset suggests that
direct private giving from individuals, foundations, and corporations is the most
important form of giving to the largest international relief organizations.
There are a number of literary sources that suport this observation. For instance,
Rose-Ackerman (1996, pp. 705) notes that compared to other countries, private
giving is particularly important to the United States non-profit community in general:
"The relative importance of public funds, private gifts, and fees or charges differs
across countries. Nowhere is private charity so important as in the United States. In
most European countries nonprofits are heavily dependent on public money, although
fees and charges are also important in some areas."
Adelman (2003) goes a step further, claiming that those who criticize the US
for providing a low level of international aid relative to national income fail to take
into account private donations, which have far surpassed government contributions.
Thus, the author argues that the future of foreign aid and assistance demands an
approach that brings private giving into the US government's strategic planning.
Interestingly, Klein and Harford (2005) contest this point, claiming that while pri-
vate financial flows are certainly having a large and growing impact, to speak of the
privitization of foreign aid as Adelman (2003) does is inaccurate since developing
country governments borrow the majority of their debt from official sources. How-
ever, the largest organizations observed in this study-such as AmeriCares, Food for
the Poor, World Vision International, etc.-are primarily engaged in shorter-term
humanitarian efforts as opposed to longer-term international development activities;
thus, this study affirms the assertion that private financing is the most important
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source of funding for humanitarian and international relief activities amongst the
largest 25 organizations in terms of revenue.
Concentration
This section attemps to explain the three periods as identified in Figure 4-11, which
plots total sectoral revenue and concentration with respect to time, given recent
literature on this sector. The following section will focus directly on the question of
whether this market exists in a state of excessive competition or cartelization.
Between 1989 to 1998 it was observed that the market experienced a period
of deconcentration and marginal growth in revenue. This paper submits that this
deconcentration occurred as a result of an increasing number of humanitarian orga-
nizations offering services at this time, which essentially diluted the market shares of
the largest firms. Further, this expansion was likely a result of a spike in violent civil
conflicts that occurred globally at the end of the Cold War as documented by Fearon
and Laitin (2004) in response to the United States and Soviet Union withdrawing
financing to states formally used for political leverage, as documented by Macrae
(2002). Additionally, during this time the United Nations implemented the Agenda
For Peace doctrine, also referenced by Macrae (2002), which essentially served as a
task-expansion tool for the sector as a whole.
Next, beginning in 1999 and up to 2008, the market saw a surge in funding, and
particularly to the largest international relief organizations as seen in Figures 4-2
and 4-3. This aligns with the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK), which was established after the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO) began its bombing campaign in Yugoslavia in 1999. UNMIK was a
large-scale operation led by primarily the United States and European powers, and in-
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ternational relief organizations played a significant role in providing services to those
affected by conflict in the region. This surge in funding continued into the 2000s,
where United States and allied military operations in Afghanistan as well as Iraq
paved the way for humanitarian organizations to assist in development activities in
impacted communities. Notably, the importance of these conflicts to the humanitar-
ian community is well documented in recent literature. For instance, Fearon (2008)
notes that since the early 1990s the majority of emergency aid has been allocated to
a small number of high-profile cases-such as the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and Sudan-that received the attention of the US government and UN Security
Council. Further, Macrae (2002) argues that the events in Kosovo in 1999 cemented
the newly-formed association between humanitarianism and security.
Finally, the drop in funding to international relief non-profits between 2008 and
2010 can likely be explained as a result of the global financial crisis of 2007 and
2008. Blackwood et al. (2012) note that as the recession hit the US economy, giving
to the non-profit community as a whole declined significantly; in fact, the authors
remark that international and foreign affairs organizations experienced the greatest
slowdown in growth at this time. This paper argues that the reason for this result is
due to the perception that international relief is a luxury good by governments and
the general public in times of recession.
4.3.2 Competition or Cartelization?
Two distinct views have formed in regards to the competitive nature of the human-
itarian marketplace over the last decade. The first, and most common, is that this
market exists in a crowded state of excessive competition. Smillie and Minear (2004,
pp. 183) put this view in its most blunt form:
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"In today's humanitarian world, the shortage of money, combined with donor
earmarking, has created a dog-eat-dog competition that is as relentless as it is uncon-
structive."
In agreeance with the sentiments of Smillie and Minear (2004) but perhaps less
harsh, Cooley and Ron (2002) argue that the behavior of international humanitarian
organizations and NGOs can be explained by incentives and constraints resulting
from an increasingly dense competitive marketplace. Specifically, the authors iden-
tify three sources of institutional failure given this market-competitive bidding,
principal-agent problems, and the multiple-principals problem-and offer examples
of how these failures played out in three separate case studies in Kyrgyzstan, the
Democratic People's Republic of Congo, and wartime Bosnia. The authors propose
that the growing number of international organizations and NGOs in this sector in-
creases uncertainty and insecurity for all other organizations. Ultimately, Cooley
and Ron (2002) suggest that excessive competition forces these organizations to act
in rent-seeking ways, negatively impacting the transactions between donors, relief
organizations, and beneficiaries.
The second camp in regards to competition in this sector suggests quite the
opposite-that this market is in a state of oligopoly or cartelization-and is less
referenced in literature. One example is provided by Stoddard (2003), who sug-
gests that a handful of large and influential organizations, such as Medecins Sans
Frontieres (MSF), Oxfam International, and World Vision International, dominate
the market. Further, she notes that these organizations tend to be composed of mul-
tiple national affiliates under various forms of confederation, and also occupy specific
niche markets-for example MSF in health and Oxfam in water and sanitation.
A more assertive study of the cartelization issue, however, is provided by Easterly
(2002). In a working paper, appropriately titled "The Cartel of Good Intentions,"
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Easterly argues that the international market for aid does not suffer from over-
competition and under-coordination as per popular belief, but rather from under-
competition and over-coordination. Essentially, the author suggests that the effi-
ciency and effectiveness of foreign aid delivery has been hindered by large, bureau-
cratic international relief agencies, and because these agencies coordinate activities-
what he describes as "collusion"-they end up "raising the price and restricting the
quantity of foreign aid service" (Easterly, 2002, pp. 12).
It would be presumptuous to extend the argument made by Easterly (2002) to
the non-profit community, since his paper concerns government agencies as opposed
to the sector as a whole. However, the idea that the market for humanitarian activity
is dominated by a small number of large organizations is at the very least worthy of
discussion, and interestingly, the observations from this dataset concerning this issue
suggest that the humanitarian marketplace may assume characteristics that are both
indicative of excessive competition and an oligopoly.
In arguing for excessive competition, the H-HI of this sector indicates that it is
currently, and has been since at least 1989, in a highly competitive state in strict reg-
ulatory terms. Department of Justice guidelines regarding concentration for antitrust
cases defines an unconcentrated market as one with an H-HI below 0.15, a moder-
ately concentrated market being between 0.15 and 0.25, and a highly concentrated
market being above 0.25 (US Department of Justice, 2012). However, this market
only breached an H-HI of 0.07 in 1989, and has since resonated about an H-HI of
approximately 0.06, as seen in Figure 4-10. It is therefore safe to say that, strictly
speaking, the international relief market in the US has been highly unconcentrated
since the end of the Cold War.
At the same time, however, the concentration ratios for this market, as seen in
Figure 4-9, indicate that this H-HI may in fact be undervalued. Notably, the firm-
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four, firm-eight, and firm-25 ratios for international relief non-profits align better
with those of the aircraft engine and engine manufacturing sectors than the machine
shop sector. This observation can perhaps be best justified by the large growth in
the number of relief non-profits that make up the "tail-end" of this market, and are
growing slowly in regards to their revenue when compared to the largest organiza-
tions, per Figure 4-4. There therefore exists a situation where a small number of
large organizations are acquiring revenue faster than the rest of the sector; however
their total market shares are decreasing due to the shear volume of newly-arriving
entrants. Thus, this analysis suggests that the international relief market does not
sit between a state of excessive competition and cartelization, but rather in some mix
of the two. The following sections will attempt to determine what this mix is, and
provide an original characterization for the competitive model of this type of market.
What is a cartel?
A cartel serves as a group of competing firms that agree, in whatever manner, to
fix prices, marketing, and production within the group. They can exist illegally,
legally within international jurisdiction, legally within a single national jurisdiction,
or legally within an export-only context (Levenstein and Suslow, 2006). For instance,
Sanburn (2012) identifies the Federation of Quebec Maple Syrup Producers (FPAQ),
which produces approximately 77% of the world's maple syrup, as an interesting ex-
ample of a domestically sanctioned and legal cartel. Since the supply of maple syrup
is highly dependent on the weather, production sharply varies from year to year.
Further, because maple syrup is not an essential food item, demand is also highly
irregular. Thus, to stablize prices, FPAQ will keep the price of syrup artificially high
in good production years, and artificially low in poor production years.
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For the purposes of this study, however, illegal cartels-that is, those that are not
officially sanctioned under domestic or international laws-are of primary concern.
Firms can choose to illegally establish a cartel for a number of reasons, the ultimate
goal being to limit competition in the market in order to increase or stabilize profits.
Additionally, firms can coordinate a cartel in one of two distinct ways, as described by
Harrington (2008). First, they can engage in explicit collusion, where firms directly
and obviously communicate in order to coordinate activities. Second, they can engage
in tacit collusion, where firms are able to coordinate their activities through some
mutual understanding without the means of direct communication. In regards to
antitrust law in the United States, a cartel is only illegal if there is evidence that firms
have explicitly colluded with one another; economic indicators in and of themselves
do not provide sufficient evidence of guilt (Harrington, 2008, pp. 215).
Detecting cartels
The process by which firms in a market are screened for collusive tendencies requires
economists to play the role of "detectives" (Harrington, 2008, pp. 213). Essentially,
cartels can be discovered through structural and behavioral methods by investigating
the conduct of firms suspected to be involved in either explicit or tacit collusion.
Structural methods, according to Harrington (2008), concern the identification of
markets with traits that are conducive to collusive action, such as where there are a
small number of large firms, homogeneous products, and stable demand. Behavioral
methods, on the other hand, involve observing the means in which firms coordinate
activities or the end result of coordination, which is most often discovered by some
form of direct communication between parties in collusive firms. Alternatively, the
behavior of cartelized firms can be revealed by market impacts of coordination. For
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instance, Harrington (2008) offers a number of "markers" of collusive behavior:
" Under certain conditions, the variance of price is lower under collusion
" Under certain conditions, prices are more strongly positively correlated under collusion 31
" Under certain conditions, market share is more stable under collusion
" Under certain conditions, a firm's market share is more negatively correlated over time under
collusion relative to competition-that is, "market sharing"
In regards to limitations, Harrington (2008) reveals two main weaknesses in de-
tecting cartels through such methodologies. First, existing collusive theory models
do not distinguish between tacit and explicit collusion. This is somewhat problem-
atic, as tacit collusion is not subject to antitrust penalties in the same way that
explicit collusion is. Thus, Harrington reasons that firms who choose to explicitly
collude do so because either they were unable to tacitly collude, or the incremental
profit from explicit collusion exceeds those expected penalties if discovered. Second,
collusive theories do not take into account that members of cartels may actively seek
to avoid arousing suspicion among buyers, competitors, or antitrust authorities.
31Harrington (2008, pp. 222) provides an example of a cartel being identified through observa-
tion of this marker-specifically, firms bidding for Oklahoma Highway Department (OHD) asphalt
contracts were suspected of colluding between 1954 and 1965 through behavioral indicators. In his
words: "During the time of suspected collusion, bids were identical and, beginning in 1957, were
constant at 10.25 cents a gallon. With identical bids, the OHD awarded the contract to the nearest
firms to the job site in order to minimize the delivery costs incurred by the state, which, it was later
argued, acted as a market allocation scheme. During the same time period, these suppliers made
bids and won contracts in other states at an average price of only 6 cents a gallon, and furthermore
the uniformity in bids in Oklahoma was not observed there. It was estimated that the maximum
freight cost for these Oklahoma contracts was 2.48 cents a gallon, which meant that any of these
firms could have won additional contracts with a price of 10.24 cents a gallon and, even if they
absorbed freight costs, would receive a net price of 7.76 cents a gallon, exceeding the price of 6
cents that these same firms bid in other states."
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Response leadership and the competitive fringe
As mentioned above, the international relief non-profit market is perhaps structured
in a way that mixes excessive competition with an oligopoly. To serve as a compara-
ble reference, D'Aspremont et al. (1983) describe the price-leadership model, which
is widely supported among the forms of market organization in which collusion is
assumed and cartelization is possible. In this model, either a dominant firm or small
group of dominant firms imposes a selling price, which is then adopted by what is
referred to as the "competitive fringe" of small producers, who are forced to also
adopt this price. Firms in this model are only given two strategies-either they join
the competitive fringe and behave as price-takers, or they join the cartel where they
jointly maximize profits.
Although this model is grounded on the idea that firms in a market compete on
price and seek to maximize profits, which is not the case in the non-profit community,
it does provide insight into how the international relief sector may be organized. This
paper argues that the international relief market is composed of a relatively small
number of large organizations that essentially serve as an oligopoly, with a tail-end
that constitutes the competitive fringe." Instead of maximizing total profits, these
firms seek to maximize total revenues, and this study has shown that they have
been successful at doing so especially since 1999. Rather than setting price, they set
the conditions for action and coordinate the response in communities who demand
relief-that is, the largest and most well-known organizations are the most influential
in terms of how goods and services are provided post-crisis, and in so doing set the
scene for the contribution of the competitive fringe. While it is not suggested that
"This paper hesitates to choose a specific number of firms that make up this oligopoly; however,
it is interesting to note that in 2010 the top 25 firms in terms of revenue in this market had acquired
83% of total donations, while only constituting approximately 1% of the total number of firms.
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explicit collusion exists amongst these firms, it is well established that the largest
and most influential NGOs have significant leverage into how responses to crisis are
managed. This market structure thus exists in the form of a newly defined response-
leadership model, which exhibits the following characteristics:
1. In the response-leadership model, firms are either part of the oligopoly or competitive fringe
2. Firms either exist in the oligopoly or competitive fringe given their relative size and influence
3. Members of the oligopoly will seek to maximize total revenues by coordinating the response
in a way that favors firms within the oligopoly, given the nature of the crisis
4. Members of the competitive fringe will assume the response conditions as established by the
oligopoly, competing for residual funds provided by government and public sources, as well
as the oligopoly itself
Analytical limitations
There are three main limitations of this analysis that must be highlighted. First, due
to time and financial constraints, the amount of data collected from the NCCS for this
study may be insufficient to draw conclusions on the market as a whole. Essentially,
this study only used a small number of IRS Form 990 data fields for the largest 25
organizations through public means, though ideally it would have collected a greater
number of data fields for all international relief non-profits claiming tax-exempt
status in a given year. This would allow for greater inferences regarding the structure
of those firms not in the top 25-that is, the tail-end of the market. For example, if
data fields concerning cash and gifts-in-kind were also collected for all organizations,
a stronger conclusion could be drawn regarding the impact of fundraising expenses
on donations to firms in various revenue brackets.
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Second, inferring the competitive nature of markets from size and concentration
observations alone can be problematic. For example, Bikker and Haaf (2000) argue
that measures of concentration do not warrant conclusions regarding the competitive
performance of markets, and that even in highly concentrated markets, such as the
banking sector, competition can be strong. Additionally, in highly unconcentrated
sectors competition can be weak-for instance, if there is a high degree of geographic
dispersion between competitors. Thus, one should be careful to draw definitive
statements regarding competition in markets from metrics alone, and should consider
other competitive forces as well.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this study has not observed any examples
of non-profit firms in any sector being charged with explicitly or tacitly forming a
cartel beyond the argument provided by Easterly (2002)-thus, this analysis has no
previous cases from which to establish a foundation. However, it appears that from a
structural standpoint it would be inherently difficult for non-profits to establish for-
mal cartels strictly speaking, simply because the nature of the philanthropic market
will not allow for it-firms cannot compete on price, they offer an extremely hetero-
geneous variety of goods and services, and the demand for their product, particularly
in the international relief environment, is often highly irregular. However, if the in-
ternational relief market is regarded as a combination of smaller niche markets-such
as food, water, health and sanitation, shelter, etc.-and knowing that many of the
largest firms fall within a specific niche, then this hypothesis becomes more viable.
4.3.3 Policy implications
The observed characteristics of the international relief non-profit market illuminate
a number of implications for policy, especially in regards to the competitive environ-
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ment of this sector. If we are to assume the response-leadership model provides a
sufficient means by which to study this market, then this structure promotes both
positive and negative outcomes. First, competition in this sector can be viewed in
a good light for the same reasons that the competitive free-market is ideal-namely,
competition promotes innovation and allows for consumers to make choices that
better align with their demands. Additionally, in regards to competition based on
marketing, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) argue that advertising one's products or
services serves a useful social function by improving the matching of consumers to
such goods, though under an oligopoly levels of advertising will always be excessive
when compared to what is required for optimal social welfare.
At the same time, excessive competition can be viewed as negative. For instance,
Klein and Harford (2005) argues that over-competition in the market for aid is a neg-
ative outcome for three reasons-(1) that recipient governments may be incentivized
to pursue too many small projects at the expense of time and scarce civil service
expertise, (2) competition can be distorted by poorly disciplined subsidies that can
devalue local markets, and (3) the market for aid does not produce enough meaning-
ful information to allow for meaningful choices by recipients and donors. To add to
this point, Rose-Ackerman (1982) notes that, concerning the non-profit community
in general, competition for charitable dollars will reduce the overall level of service
provision, especially when market barriers to entry are low. In her words:
"Not only will advertising be 'excessive' in the absence of entry barriers, but,
when the fundraising share enters the donors' decision-making calculus, the system
may be unstable. In addition, charities that are already large will grow larger, while
those that have funding difficulties will contract."
Second, the coordination of activities of the largest relief organizations can be
regarded as a positive outcome. For one, the international relief environment is
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often described as a free-for-all, where post-crisis uncertainty and the shear volume
of responding organizations will complicate the delivery of humanitarian goods and
exacerbate the situation. Thus, leadership is an important trait in such responses.
However, over-coordination can also be negative. Oligopolies, monopolies, and
cartels are generally undesired traits of markets in general, mainly because they limit
choices of consumers in terms of price, quantity, and quality. Of course, this is why
the Department of Justice has standards regarding market concentration and carries
out antitrust regulation in the first place.
Thus, the ultimate goal of policies concerning the international relief sector should
be to provide a healthy balance between excessive fringe competition and the largest
organizations overly dictating movements in the market. This is essentially analo-
gous to a mixture of what Klein and Harford (2005) describe as "productive chaos,"
where competition increases efficiency and spurs innovation while allowing for failure.
Therefore, the firms that constitute the response-leadership are needed to coordinate
activities post-crisis and lobby for growth in the sector as a whole, while the com-
petitive fringe is needed to produce market innovations and pressure the largest
organizations to maintain a degree of honesty and accountability.
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Chapter 5
Can Performance Measurement
Improve the Market for
Humanitarian Relief?
"... information, as it regards organization quality, is significant in determining
how donors and organizations conduct themselves within the philanthropic, or chari-
table, marketplace. While a seemingly obvious result on the surface, the way in which
information manifests itself is quite unique with respect to other economic markets...
in that donors often times can't experience firsthand the charitable output toward
which they contribute. In this respect, information and signals about organizational
quality and behavior take on heightened importance..."
-Wardell (2009, pp. 191)
This chapter introduces and briefly evaluates policies concerning performance
measurement that may be implemented in the international relief sector. First, the
concepts of market design and failure are reviewed, and inefficiencies, inequities,
and forms of disorder in the humanitarian marketplace are presented. Performance
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measurement policies from a governmental and institutional standpoint are then ex-
amined, considering how they might be established, how they would improve market
mechanisms, and their limitations and practical barriers to implementation. Finally,
the idea that KPIs can serve as voluntary signals of organizational quality in the
humanitarian marketplace is discussed in detail.
5.1 Designing and improving markets
An important concern of public and institutional policy is the design of markets
when the first welfare theorem, summarized by Oye (2012), is violated:
If there is a market for all goods, competition is perfect, information is perfect,
there are no transaction costs, and there are no externalities, then free markets will
lead to a Pareto-efficient outcome. 1
Notably, a Pareto-efficient allocation of resources in a market will often consider
societal standards in combination with traditional economic efficiency. In particular,
the two other factors that go into the calculus of whether a market is "efficient"
besides issues of economy include order as argued by Hobbes (1651), and equity as
argued by Rawls (1971). Order essentially considers the authority of a state's legit-
imate authority over the individual, while equity refers to fairness and distributive
justice as defined by government and social standards of the people.
A market may "fail" by standards of economy, order, and equity in a number of
ways-for instance, due to anti-competitive behavior of firms, poorly defined prop-
erty rights, positive and negative externalities, asymmetric information, or issues of
coordination. Roth (2009), who won a Nobel Prize in economics in 2012 for his work
'A "Pareto-efficient" economic allocation, introduced as a concept by Pareto (1906), is one where
no one can be made better off without making at least one individual worse off.
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on market design, argues that there are three reasons markets fail. First, markets
must provide thickness in that they need to attract a sufficient number of partici-
pants to transact with one another. Second, they must overcome the congestion that
thickness brings by providing opportunity to allow participants to consider enough
alternative possible transactions. Finally, markets must be safe and simple in that
they make it convenient to participate in the market, as opposed to transacting
outside or engaging in strategic behavior that will reduce overall welfare.
Solving these issues is no simple task. People frequently have different opinions
on the standards of society in regards to markets, while governments frequently have
different views on the state's role in maintaining authority over its population and
commerce. Additionally, other welfare-reducing factors may seep into the market
design and policy-making process, such as issues of collective action or bureaucratic
politics. Still, it is a decent excercise to investigate inefficiencies, inequities, and
disorder in marketplaces to help identify policies that may improve their design.
5.1.1 Proposed inefficiencies, inequities, and disorder in the
humanitarian marketplace
Given the three roots of market failure cited by Roth (2009) and discussed above,
the humanitarian marketplace likely suffers from issues of congestion. For one, the
market certainly does not suffer from issues of thickness or simplicity, as there are
thousands of humanitarian organizations that perform a wide variety of activities,
and it would be difficult to charge any of these organizations directly with anti-
competitive behavior. Instead, it is more likely that donors are not provided suffi-
cient opportunity to analyze market choices, since humanitarian organizations know
significantly more about the quality of their operations than others.
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Specifically from a performance measurement perspective, the following list sum-
marizes the inefficiencies, inequities, and disorder that appear in the humanitarian
marketplace due to issues of congestion and asymmetric information. Some of these
issues are not necessarily solvable; for example, it may be impossible to arrive at
pure definitions of "well" and "poorly" performing humanitarian organizations from
a supply chain perspective. However, this list instead serves the important purpose
of shedding light on how improvements in this market can be directed.
1. Difficulties in quantifying and comparing operations across multiple firms
2. Lack of definition of what constitutes a humanitarian organization that performs "well" or
one that performs "poorly"
3. Difficulties in disbursing funds to organizations on a merit basis and filter out "poor" per-
forming organizations-that is, allow for failure-from the market altogether
4. Hinderance of growth of smaller, effective, and efficient organizations due to oligopoly and
funding capture amongst the largest organizations
5. Lack of understanding amongst donor community and general public of firm operations and
quantitative results to beneficiaries
5.2 Proposed performance measurement policies
Policies made to correct for market inefficiencies, inequities, and disorder in the mar-
ket for humanitarian relief primarily come from two domains-government regulation
and institutional action. This section highlights a few proposed policies from both
perspectives, how they might work in practice, and their limitations.
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Regulation calls for the government to command and control activity in the mar-
ketplace in order to influence the structure and conduct of firms in the sector. Since
regulation cannot improve the economic performance of non-profits in terms of mar-
gin and stakeholder value (since these would require a bottom line), regulation can
instead be used as a tool to enhance funding mechanisms in this sector.
Institutional action, on the other hand, refers to steps that firms within the
sector might take on their own accord to improve these mechanisms-that is, self-
regulation. While government regulation represents a "top-down" approach to orga-
nizational change, institutional adapation represents a "bottom-up" solution where
the behavior of one firm or a group of firms influences the behavior of others. In
effect, institutional policies can be viewed as a more natural approach to improving
the market compared to direct command and control regulation.
5.2.1 Voluntary release of performance data
The first policy highlighted here concerns the voluntarily release of performance data
from humanitarian organizations to donors or the general public. This data could be
in the form of well-known and somewhat standardized KPIs, such as dock-to-stock
time or warehouse usage ratios, however they could also be in the form of large
outputs of unfiltered data that can then be analyzed.
Of course, voluntary inherently implies a lack of control and therefore this policy
can be viewed as an institutional approach to improving the humanitarian mar-
ketplace. Specifically, there are three mechanisms at work under this approach.
First, the voluntary release of data would improve sectoral accountability across
the board-from donors to other organizations, and to direct beneficiaries of aid.
It would also allow donors, researchers, and the public a means to better identify
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poorly- from well-performing organizations. Finally, if enough organizations were to
release logistics and supply chain data, the humanitarian community could arrive at
a better consensus of what exactly constitutes a successful relief chain.
At the same time, however, the voluntary release of data brings up a number of
issues. First and most obviously, many organizations view data as proprietary and
would not be inclined to release it publicly (though they may be more inclined to
release it to researchers under conditions of anonymity). Further, many humanitarian
organizations do not capture sufficient data on their operations, and even if they did,
it would be difficult to characterize a successful humanitarian organization in a sector
populated by extremely heterogeneous firms.
5.2.2 Industry-wide standards
Implementing industry-wide standards on firm behavior could provide a means to
improve the market by forcing humanitarian non-profits to meet decided benchmarks
of conduct. Standards are frequently agreed upon in other industries in the US and
worldwide-for example, the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
acts as a governing body for the mechanical engineering sector, organizing standards
and codes of conduct to promote industrial competency.
A society of international relief NGOs would allow for organizations and their
stakeholders to meet in an open forum and arrive at mutual standards that would
benefit the industry as a whole and provide donors a better sense of how the conduct
of a specific firm matches up with the rest of the market. Like the voluntary release
of data, promoting industry-wide performance standards would be a bottom-up in-
stitutional approach to improving market mechanisms. One major limitation to this
approach, however, would be the difficulty in enacting such standards.
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5.2.3 Club formation
Forming organizational "clubs" provides comparable benefits to institutional soci-
eties that implement industry-wide standards, the key difference being that clubs
can choose to be highly selective and thus signal greater quality to potential donors.
Non-profit clubs are not a new topic and have been discussed previously in academic
literature. For instance, Gugerty (2009) examines voluntary accountability programs
and standard-setting programs of non-profit organizations, arguing that these pro-
grams are essentially collective action institutions designed to signal value to donors
and other stakeholders.
Yet forming a club does not necessarily imply superior performance or quality
in and of itself. Notably, Gugerty (2009) in her study observes that the primary
distinction between a strong and weak standard-setting program is the use of disclo-
sure or verification to enforce compliance. Thus, while voluntary humanitarian relief
clubs can signal quality to donors, their compliance and verification mechanisms
(e.g., annual auditing) must be strongly built to maintain credibility.
5.2.4 Third-party monitoring schemes
A third-party performance measurement monitoring scheme would consist of some
third-party organization or institution who serves as an audit for and grader of hu-
manitarian non-profits. This can serve as either a top-down regulatory approach-if
government required such activity-or a bottom-up institutional approach-if eval-
uating agencies arise independently.
In fact, third-party monitoring schemes already exist in the non-profit community
to some degree, most notably with online services such as GuideStar and Charity
Navigator. These organizations essentially serve as independent evaluators of chari-
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ties, providing ratings on their financial health, accountability, and transparency. A
further step would be to provide analysis on the performance of charities and perhaps
their logistics activities-however, this is problematic due to the inherent difficulties
with judging performance and aggregating across various types of non-profits.
5.2.5 Mandated release of standard performance metrics
The final approach mentioned here is the governmental mandate for humanitarian
organizations to release performance metrics. This could come in the form of a
document similar to the IRS 990 Form, or could even be another page attachment
to this file. This would of course be a top-down regulatory approach to improving
the marketplace by forcing relief firms to disclose their operational performance and
allowing better differentiation between quality and non-quality firms.
One limitation of this approach, however, is that whatever measurements or met-
rics required by regulation must come in a standardized format. This would likely
be difficult to pitch since humanitarian organizations, as highlighted above, engage
in a variety of different activities in different ways, and thus it would be problematic
to judge quality across these firms. Nevertheless, there are likely to be some metrics
that are relevant to all international relief organizations, though further research
needs to be done on what these metrics might be.
5.2.6 Limitations and practical barriers
There are a few major limitations and practical barriers to implementing institutional
and regulatory policies that are of particular note. In regards to the bottom-up
institutional approach, for instance, firms in the international relief sector would
need the incentive to release proprietary data or established industry-wide standards,
166
perhaps beyond pure arguments of transparency and accountability. In addition, any
such policy would need to somehow separate firms in the market by mission, the types
of activities they carry out, and how they do so.
Further, in regards to the top-down governmental approach, Aldashev et al. (2012,
pp. 3-4) note that the very nature of non-governmental firms makes it inherently
problematic to enforce regulatory control. In their words:
"... given that nonprofit organizations are also non-governmental, the 'top-down'
government intervention is unlikely to be effective, because it would [be] perceived
as undermining the very essence of these organizations. Edwards and Hulme (1996)
argue that the stronger are the links of nonprofits with the government agencies, the
less effective the nonprofits are in pursuing independently their missions."
At the same time, however, Aldashev et al. (2012) argue that government in
fact has several tools that can affect the competitive equilibrium of the international
relief sector-for example, by subsidizing or taxing the fixed costs of setting up a
non-profit (i.e., establishing market entry conditions), providing matching grants to
non-profits proportional to private donations collected, or influencing the overall size
of the market by varying the tax deductibility of charitable donations. Thus, there
are means in which governmental approaches can provide legitimate solutions to
addressing inequities and inefficiencies in this market.
5.3 KPIs as a signal of organizational quality
5.3.1 Signaling theory
Signaling as an ecomomic theory was introduced in the 1970s by Spence (1973), who
developed a model demonstrating how the investment in signals, or observable and
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alterable characteristics, can convey information to others by increasing the certainty
of their perceptions. The example used by Spence concerns the job market, where
hiring essentially serves as an investment of the employing organization under a
great deal of uncertainty. Because the employer has difficulty in evaluating the
productive abilities of the potential employee at the time of hiring, its decision to
hire an individual (and at what wage) must be based off personal characteristics of
that individual. One of the primary means to signal productivity in the job market is
through one's education-since education has costs in terms of time and effort, only
those who are qualified and capable will choose to invest in receiving a degree. Thus,
an educational signal allows employers a greater deal of certainty when evaluating a
potential employee's workplace productivity.
Interestingly, there have been a number of studies that apply signaling theory to
the non-profit sector. For instance, Glazer and Konrad (1996) argue that observable
charitable donations can serve as a tool to signal wealth or income to others. The
authors create an economic model assuming that individuals to varying degrees have
a desire to demonstrate wealth, perhaps because they prefer to socialize with those of
the same or higher social brackets. This model implies that individuals who donate
to signal their income will not make anonymous donations, which is supported by
empirical evidence that, of the 1,950 entries to the 1991 Yale Law Report naming
alumni donors to the Yale Law School Fund, only four were anonymous. While this
observation can not be generalized across all facets of non-profit activity, it does
indicate that to at least some degree individuals may donate to signal status.
Another study that concerns signaling in the non-profit sector is by Gugerty
(2009), who argues that non-profit voluntary accountability and standard-setting
programs signal information of organizational quality to external stakeholders. The
author examines 32 non-profit accountability programs, acquiring data on program
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standards, fees, certification and monitoring mechanisms, disclosure rules, and sanc-
tioning mechanisms, observing that the key distinction between strong and weak ac-
countability programs is the use of disclosure or verification mechanisms that enforce
compliance. Adding to this conclusion, Reinhardt (2009) surveys non-profit activity
in Brazil, arguing that donors give to organizations with higher levels of profession-
alism and accountability, which are represented by signals. Essentially, these papers
imply that donors value transparency and accountability of non-profit organizations,
and that these characteristics can be displayed externally to the market.
Perhaps the work most related to this thesis, however, comes from Wardell (2009),
who examines how signals of quality affect donor and organizational decisions in the
humanitarian space. In his dissertation, the author develops two models and tests his
results using an observational dataset provided by GlobalGiving, an online charitable
marketplace. The first model uses game theory to identify under what circumstances
humanitarian relief organizations of high- and low-productivity will choose to signal
their work to donors. Notably, Wardell observes that the decision a firm makes on
whether or not to signal quality will depend on the ratio of available donations to the
number of relief organizations acting in that particular environment-as this ratio
decreases, the incentives for a high-productivity organization to signal its quality to
donors will increase.
Though the work by Wardell (2009) does well to quantify when humanitarian
organizations will choose to signal quality, it rides on the assumption that these firms
are capable of signaling quality to donors. This thesis has argued that this assumption
is problematic, and that humanitarian organizations in fact have a difficult time in
portraying their performance to donors in a meaningful way. Thus, an extension of
the study by Wardell, provided below, is whether or not KPIs as outlined in the first
part of this thesis provide a means for these organizations to signal quality.
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5.3.2 Can KPIs signal quality in the humanitarian space?
A question relevant to this thesis is whether KPIs can serve as an external signal of
quality in the humanitarian space. For example, if HHI and others can internally
develop KPIs to measure performance and guide strategy, can they also use these
metrics as a means to positively distinguish themselves from other firms?
There are two sides to looking at this question which offer different responses. The
first is that, yes, KPIs can be used as a legitimate marketing tool to aid humanitarian
firms by serving as an indicator of quality and accountability. For one, a firm may
choose to either make public its supply chain data or its performance metrics-
which may also be verified through some third-party means-as a way to advertise
to donors, beneficiaries, and the general public. Those organizations who choose to
do this may be viewed as more accountable and transparent than those that do not,
which serves as a signal in and of itself.
At the same time, however, the single major limitation of evaluating the perfor-
mance of humanitarian firms is in the variety of activities these firms carry out and
how they do so. Through this way of looking at the problem the answer is then no,
it would be near impossible to use KPIs as a means to distinguish the performance
across relief organizations because generalizing their activities is problematic.
As the two sides of looking at the problem produce conflicting results, the true
answer must lie somewhere between. First, KPIs can be used as a marketing tool by
organizations to distinguish themselves from others, and donors should take seriously
those firms that choose to advertise this information as it should be regarded as
progressive market behavior. However, donors and the general public should be
careful to generalize KPIs across different types of organizations-for instance, those
that perform short-term response versus long-term development programs, those
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that manage mostly cash versus gifts-in-kind, or those that operate in a specific
geographic or situational environments and those who do not. Therefore, it is a
crucial point to consider performance in the context of how the firm operates, and in
fact, a goal of the humanitarian community should be for performance and impact to
become a general characteristic of such firms-alongside mission, financial strength,
accountability, and transparency.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Further Research
"Making money is far easier than giving it away effectively."
-Warren Buffet, as cited in The Economist (2011)
Evaluating an organization's performance-from either an internal or external
standpoint-is no easy task. It is an especially difficult challenge in the non-profit
sector, where success is not measured in dollars, activities across similar organi-
zations vary by a wide margin, and donors to causes are inherently disconnected
from beneficiaries. This thesis served to provide insight into how performance in the
humanitarian environment can be evaluated, and how performance measurement
policies might impact the broader international relief market as a whole.
Conclusions
The first part of this thesis illustrated a process by which humanitarian organiza-
tions can evaluate their performance. A key performance indicator (KPI) system
that focused on logistics operations for Heart to Heart International (HHI) was suc-
cessfully developed and handed off to the Director of Global Logistics within the
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organization. This system was evaluated using criteria as defined by Caplice and
Sheffi (1994, 1995), and was argued to be well-balanced and integrated across the
organization's logistics functions. The true value of this exercise, however, was in
conveying how the top-down and bottom-up approaches to measuring performance
can be used to observe a set of KPIs for an organization that merges day-to-day
activities of the firm with its overall mission. Although the KPI system illustrated
here is specific to HHI's logistics operations, other firms are encouraged to use this
approach to develop their own systems.
The second part of this thesis discussed the potential impact of performance
measurement on the humanitarian marketplace. Data derived from the National
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) was successfully used to model high-level
financial trends of the international relief non-profit sector in the United States, and
in particular of the largest 25 organizations. This analysis serves as a useful proof
of concept, as quantitative information regarding transactions in this market are
severely lacking. From this dataset, a number of particularly interesting insights
were made, including:
* Claims that the number of organizations in the international relief sector and their total
revenues have increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War was validated. The
most significant gains in terms of revenue were made by the largest eight firms in the market,
yet these organizations also took the greatest hit in funding after 2008.
" Fundraising as a percentage of total expenses for the largest international relief non-profits
has decreased over time, from 10% on average in 1989 to roughly 5% today. This is contrary
to a number of assertions made regarding this market, and is likely due to a variety of
reasons-e.g., improved media technologies, greater awareness and willingness of donors to
fund humanitarian activity, the ratchet-effect, donor retention, etc.
" Direct public support to international relief efforts was found to dominate acquired funding of
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the largest 25 organizations in this market, representing roughly 70% of their total revenues
in 2010. This form of support is continuing to grow, though it remains to be seen where it will
level-off with respect to government grants. This is an interesting result as it demonstrates
the importance of private financing from individuals, foundations, corporations, and other
organizations to international humanitarian efforts.
e The competitive nature of this market was defined in terms of a newly introduced response-
leadership model, which takes inspiration from the price-leadership model of for-profit firms
as described by D'Aspremont et al. (1983). This model is argued to fit the international relief
non-profit sector, since the largest organizations continue to raise revenue faster than the
rest of the market while the unconstrained growth in the number of total firms dilutes the
concentration of these large firms. Thus, an oligopoly exists between the largest organizations
who acquire the majority of revenue each year and define response activities for the rest of
the market, while those firms who make up the market fringe remain highly competitive.
In regards to performance measurement policies, a number of institutional and
governmental approaches were summarized as well as their limitations and practical
barriers to implementation. These policies included the voluntary release of per-
formance measurement data, industry-wide standards, club formation, third-party
monitoring schemes, and the regulated distribution of an established set of metrics.
Specifically concerning the issue of whether KPIs can externally signal quality, the
answer is both yes and no. For one, humanitarian organizations can use KPIs as mar-
keting tools to improve their transparency to the donating public and signal their
performance in functional areas. However, a universal system that can be used to
compare performance across multiple organizations will be hard to come by, simply
due to the extreme variety of the strategies of these organizations as well as how
they carry out their activities-that is, the very same reason choosing KPIs must be
a unique exercise for each firm.
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Further research
The were a number of topics tangential to this thesis that would be interesting to
study in the future. For one, it would be useful to evaluate how the KPI system de-
veloped here impacts HHI's logistics operations and strategy over time-for instance,
are there operational improvements and in what areas, do they modify the system,
etc. Second, it would be interesting to develop logistics KPIs for the firm's warehouse
in Haiti and evaluate the differences between an in-country logistics system and one
that is more general. Third, it would be useful to see how this approach plays out for
other humanitarian non-profits who operate differently than HHI, an organization
that plays a very specific role within the international relief chain.
From the second part of the thesis, a more robust study needs to be performed on
the NCCS dataset that was used to analyze the international relief market. Ideally,
more data fields would have been acquired for all organizations in the Core Data
Files, rather than those just in the top 25. This would allow for a better analysis of
the tail-end of the market, and thus stronger conclusions in regards to how sectoral
concentration affects their behavior. Additionally, this type of study could be per-
formed on other non-profit markets. Since non-profit data transactions are notorious
difficult to follow, further studies that attempt to categorize market structures in
this way might point to public and institutional policies that improve other sectors.
Regarding the classification of the three periods in this sector given concentration
and revenue data, more NCCS data fields would also be useful to monitor what
specific categories of organizations-whether by geographic region in the United
States, firm focus, etc.-grew over these identified time periods and if there is any
way to match up increased giving to specific moments in time. For instance, it
would be interesting to determine whether organizations that were heavily involved
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in responses to conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Iraq grew quicker
relative to others due to the intense political interest in these cases. Ultimately, more
data would help better align the quantitative assertions made from this dataset with
what has been written in academic and organizational literature.
Further, research on methods to track the flow of money from governments and
the general public to non-profits and beneficiaries would be useful. Though the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides a solid
repository of data from where governments initially allocate funding, and the NCCS
provides good information on where non-profits in the United States receive funds,
there is little understanding of how aid trickles down the humanitarian system.
Lastly, it remains to be seen whether humanitarian organizations can use KPIs
or systems of metrics as external indicators of quality, and if KPI signaling can
actually improve market mechanisms in this sector. Nevertheless, any means used
by humanitarian organizations to externally distribute KPI systems will be well-
received and positively impact the humanitarian environment in the following ways:
" Improve the alignment of donors-including individuals, foundations, corporations, and
governments-with humanitarian non-profits that match their interests and charitable goals
" Increase donor confidence in these firms by providing a better means of what humanitarian
organizations do, how they do it, and how motivated they are to improve their actions
" Help to identify poorly performing organizations who adamantly choose not to be transparent
or accountable in regards to their operational performance
Evaluating quality, both internally and externally, is a tricky business. Of course,
this thesis aimed to move research forward in regards to the measurement of activity
in the humanitarian space; however, what would be even better is if it assists, even in
some small way, those who dedicate their life to this community and those in need.
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Appendix A
Organizational KPIs Non-Specific
to Logistics Operations
In addition to those key performance indicators (KPIs) defined in Chapter 3 that
are specific to Heart to Heart International's (HHI) logistics operations, a number of
other metrics not directly related to logistics activities were identified as being useful
throughout the making of this case study. This appendix identifies and categorizes
these metrics into three functional areas-(1) finance and fundraising, (2) monitoring
and evaluation, and (3) donor, partner, and community relations. Of course, this
list is not exhaustive and merely serves as a starting point for what other types of
indicators can be observed for activities beyond logistics and supply chain operations.
A. 1 Finance and fundraising
Programmatic expense ratio (PER) The programmatic expense ratio (PER)
represents the percentage of total expenses that go directly to programs. This ratio is
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particularly important to HHI, as historically it has maintained a high PER relative
to other humanitarian organizations, typically on the order of 95% to 98%. Thus,
it is suggested that HHI maintain a close eye on this metric since it serves as an
important marketing tool to the organization. A PER in the high 90-percent range
should be regarded as a positive outcome for HHI, though this benchmark may vary
for other organizations due to differences in how their operations are conducted.
PER = Programmatic expenses
Total expenses
Competitive PER (CPER) Although PER serves as a useful indicator for the
organization internally, it is also useful to consider this metric with respect to other
humanitarian organizations of similar size and function (i.e., competitors). The
competitive PER (CPER) is therefore defined as the PER of HHI divided by the
average PER of five competiting firms of HHI's choosing, and indicates the extent
to which HHI's historically high PER value continues to serve as a competitive
advantage of the firm. One major disadvantage of CPER is that it utilizes financial
metrics from competiting firms, which is of course proprietary information. While
the information required to calculated PER of an organization is made publically
available through an organization's IRS Form 990, these are not made available until
the following calendar year. Thus, CPER will lag behind present day operations.
CPER = PERHHI
PER5 competitors
Fundraising expense ratio (FER) The fundraising expense ratio (FER) is de-
fined as the percentage of total expenses that go towards fundraising activities. His-
torically, HHI has maintained a FER less than 1%, which is a positive result for the
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organization. Although it is not necessarily a negative indication of performance if
an organization's FER rises, it is important for HHI to observe this indicator over
time as their marketing potential will be hurt if this value grows unrestricted.
FER = Fundraising expenses
Total expenses
Cash-to-fundraising ratio (CFR) An organization's cash-to-fundraising ratio
(CFR) is defined as the total value of cash acquired by the organization over the
past year divided by the organization's total fundraising expenses during that time.
Essentially, it serves as an indication for the marginal contribution of each fundraising
dollar to the organization's cash assets. For instance, if HHI acquired US$20,000 in
cash donations over a year's time and committed US$10,000 to fundraising over that
same period, then CFR would be 2, meaning that each fundraising dollar brought in
US$2 in cash, on average.
CFR Captured 
cash
Fundraising expenses
A.2 Monitoring and evaluation
Partner response rate (PRR) The partner response rate (PRR) is defined as
the percentage of partners responding to external HHI surveys. When HHI delivers
product to a partner, they also request for a prediction of the number of beneficiaries
served, the satisfaction of the partner with HHI's service, amongst other information.
Thus, it is ideal that the organization have a high PRR as this allows HHI to better
understand how its products are being used and to what degree HHI maintains
contact with partners.
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Partners responding to external surveys
PRR =
Total partners polled
A.3 Donor, partner, and community relations
Donor acknowledgment ratio (DAR) The donor acknowledgment ratio (DAR)
is defined as the percentage of donors of cash or product to HHI who are acknowl-
edged by the organization for their donation. Thanking donors is especially impor-
tant from a marketing, branding, and commercial relations perspective. It is highly
recommended that HHI seek to improve this metric over time as this will help the
organization maintain previously acquired business.
DAR = Count of unique donors acknowledged
Total count of unique donors
Partner satisfaction ratio (PSR) The partner satisfaction ratio (PSR) indicates
the percentage of partners who are satisfied with their orders. Satisfaction can refer to
either the timeliness of the order and subsequent shipment, or the quality of product.
This metric therefore indicates the extent to which partners of HHI are content with
the products and performance of the organization. HHI does not currently collect
information on customer satisfaction, though a simple question could be placed on
external surveys to partners requesting their level of satisfaction.
PSR = Responding partners designated as "satisfied" 
or better
Total count of responding partners
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Appendix B
Logistics KPI Survey
The following pages include the logistics KPI survey that was submitted to the staff
and board of Heart to Heart International (HHI) in April 2013. The survey consists
of 12 questions and is broken up into four parts-background, logistics perceptions,
logistics objectives, and performance measurement. A complete analysis of the re-
sults of this survey is performed in the top-down analysis section of Chapter 3.
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Heart to Heart intemational and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) are carrying out a joint research project
to evaluate how logistics activities of humanitarian organizations can be measured. This 4-part survey asks for your
perceptions of Heart to Heart's logistics department and role within the broader humanitarian relief community. It will take
approximately 10-15 minutes to complete. Your responses are 100% anonymous.
Please use this page to provide general background information of yourself and role within Heart to Heart Intemational.
*1. What is the job title for your current position?
2. With what department within the organization are you affiliated?
*3. For how many years have you worked or been affiliated with Heart to Heart
International?
I ]
*4. How often does your role within the organization require you to interact operationally
with the logistics department?
r I am part of the logistics department
C Daily
C Weekly
C Monthly
C Seldom
C Never
Page 1
Logistics refers to the activities that coordinate the movement of products and services from suppliers to customers. In
the humanitarian field, logistics connects donors to beneficiaries. Please comment on your perception of Heart to Heart
Intemational's logistics department.
*5. How important is product and gift-in-kind (GIK) distribution to the success of Heart to
Heart International?
r Not an important activity
C Not as important as other activities
C Just as important as other activities
C Very Important activity
C The most important activity
*6. How much should Heart to Heart charge partners relative to logistics costs (e.g.,
labor, warehouse costs, etc.)?
r HHI provides everything free of charge (covers all costs)
C HH covers half its costs
C HHI recovers all costs (breakeven)
C HHI generates modest surplus revenue to invest in other activities
C HHI generates significant surplus revenue to Invest in other activities
* 7. Briefly state, in your own words, what the main objective of Heart to Heart's logistics
department should be (limit 100 characters).
Page 2
Heart to Heart International's logistics department is considering 12 performance objectives. Below are two questions
about these objectives, which are sorted in the same order for each question.
8. On a scale of 1 (not important) to 5 (very important), how critical is each objective to the
organization?
Not Important Just as important as Very important
other objectives
Ability of supply chain to C r r r C
adapt quickly
Accountability and C C C C C
transparency towards donors
and partners
Availability of wide array of r C C C
products to partners
Community involvement C C C C C
Constant development and C C C r C
improvement of supply
chain processes
Direct delivery of aid to r C C C C
beneficiaries (as opposed to
direct to partners)
Good communication r C C C C
between supply chain
(logistics) staff and other
departments
Leveraging volunteers for C C C C C
services
Low operating costs C C C C
Quality and accuracy of C C C C C
orders delivered to partners
Quality of available C C C
products
Time efficiency (as quick as C C C C C
possible)
1g3e 3
9. On a scale of 1 (not met) to 5 (goals exceeded), how well are the above objectives
currently being met by the organization?
pN o m et 
A dequa ty n et G oals e ceededAbility of su ply chain to C
adapt quickly
Accountability and C C C C C
transparency towards donors
and partners
Availability of wide array of C C C C C
products to partners
Community involvement C C C C C
Constant development and C C C
improvement of supply
chain processes
Direct delivery of aid to C C C C C
beneficiaries (as opposed to
direct to partners)
Good communication C C C C
between supply chain
(logistics) staff and other
departments
Leveraging volunteers for C C C C C
services
Low operating costs C C C C C
Quality and accuracy of C C C C C
orders delivered to partners
Quality of available C C C C C
products
Time efficiency (as quick as C C C C C
possible)
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Please comment on how Heart to Heart International can define a successful logistics department. The same
performance outcomes are listed in both questions 10 and 11.
10. Heart to Heart's logistics department is currently able to measure the following
outcomes. Which would you like to see included in the Heart to Heart monthly report?
F Accuracy of items stocked in the warehouse
F Accuracy of orders delivered to partners / beneficiaries
F Quantity of donations received from donors
F Quantity of products delivered direct to beneficiaries
F Quantity of products delivered to partners
F Quantity of product disposed of due to expiration or obsolescence
F Number of unique destination countries to which product is shipped
F Number of unique partners to which product Is shipped
F Number of unique projects
F Number of unique donors donating product
F Time between when a receipt arrives at the warehouse and when it is stocked in the warehouse
F Time between when an order is placed and when it is shipped from the warehouse
F Total value of donations received from donors
F Total value of product delivered to partners / beneficiaries
F Value of product disposed of due to expiration or obsolescence
Page
11. On a scale of I (strongly decreasing) to 7 (strongly increasing), please Indicate how
each measure should be changing over time.
Accuracy of items stocked in,
the warehouse
Accuracy of orders delivered
to partners / beneficiaries
Quantity of donations
received from donors
Quantity of products
delivered direct to
beneficiaries
Quantity of products
delivered to partners
Quantity of product disposed
of due to expiration or
obsolescence
Number of unique
destination countries to which
product is shipped
Number of unique partners to
which product is shipped
Number of unique projects
Number of unique donors
donating product
Time between when a
receipt arrives at the
warehouse and when it Is
stocked In the warehouse
Time between when an order
is placed and when it is
shipped from the warehouse
Total value of donations
received from donors
Total value of product
delivered to partners /
beneficiaries
Value of product disposed of
due to expiration or
obsolescence
Strongly Moderately Marginally Doesn't matter If
decreasing decreasing decreasing increasing or
decreasing
rC r r
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C-
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
r-
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C-
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
Cr
Marginally Moderately Strongly
increasing increasing increasing
CC
C
C
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12. Are there any additional measures of logistics activity that you would like to see
included in the monthly report, even if it cannot currently be calculated by the
organization?
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